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ABSTRACT
Medical errors occur despite precautionary measures. Limited research has focused on
intuition in preventing medical errors. The problem addressed in this study explored the
role of intuition by health care team members in preventing medical errors from reaching
hospitalized patients. The research questions focused on the differences in response to
medical errors by health care team members from 3 West Coast hospitals. The theoretical
framework included human error, personality typing, skill acquisition, and a model of
intuition. In this exploratory mixed method study 1,836 unusual occurrence reports
submitted over 6 months were analyzed. Of the 710 health care team members surveyed,
201 (28%) completed an intuitive score instrument. Eight health care team members were
interviewed, with responses analyzed for themes of knowledge management implicit to
intuition. The unusual occurrences results were categorized as near miss or adverse event
and analyzed using t tests. There were no differences in a comparison of mean intuition
scores for type of error and levels of intuition by participant age or gender. Differences
were found in the number of documented constructs of intuition by type of error and
discipline in the comparison of pharmacy to nursing and diagnostic imaging. Interview
excerpts were compiled for use by managers to role model through storytelling how
intuition can prevent medical errors. Research is needed to understand how to incorporate
skills of tacit recognition and intuition. Preventing costly and potentially life-threatening
medical errors is fundamental to addressing the societal need to lower costs and provide
safer patient care.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
Introduction
Knowledge and error flow from the same mental sources.
Only success can tell one from the other. (Mach, 1975, p. 84)
Health care team members do not intend nor want to make mistakes, yet medical
errors occur. The notion that patients may suffer harm, not from an underlying illness or
disease process, but from a procedure, the wrong medication, a faulty piece of equipment,
or a fatigued health care team member, has led to a national focus on reducing medical
errors (Kohn, Corrigan, & Donaldson, 2000; Morath & Turnbull, 2005). Health care
managers and leaders, as well as state and federal agencies, struggle to find ways to
prevent medical errors from reaching patients.
Part of the struggle has resulted from the normalized deviance associated with
medical errors. Vaughn (1996) wrote about the tragedy of the Challenger space launch.
She reported that officials in the aerospace industry, when confronted with evidence that
something was wrong, normalized the deviance so that it became acceptable. Even as
researchers have summarized the magnitude of medical errors, health care seemingly
accepts this normalized deviance as part of doing business. The Institute of Medicine
(2001) summarized the significance by commenting, “When deviant events become
acceptable, the potential for errors is created because signals are overlooked or
misinterpreted and accumulate without being noticed” (pp. 55-56).
A second part of the struggle comes from the embedded organizational culture
surrounding errors. The basis for a prevailing culture is a set of “beliefs and expectations
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about life within the organization” (Behal, 2004, p. 53). Established and documented
expectations shape the culture of a company. This acceptance of normalized deviance
when errors occur, coupled with the lack of error causation analysis to examine
contributing factors, has shaped the existing culture of safety in health care (Haig, 2003;
Latino, 1994; Leape, 1998; Poniatowski, 2004).
A third element of the resistance is that health care is perceived as one of the
“most entrenched, change-averse industries in the United States” (Christensen, Bohmer,
& Kenagy, 2000, p. 102). Patient advocates, business owners, employer groups, and
factions of health care team members are no longer tolerating this acceptance of errors.
There is a demand for health care organizations and management to amend the culture of
safety (Institute of Medicine, 2001; Kohn et al., 2000); however, the change has been
slow in coming.
There has to be something greater that compels health care organizations to make
a social change away from the accepted normalized deviance associated with medical
errors. Christensen (1997) introduced the concept of disruptive innovation, that is, when
advances disrupt customary business models sufficiently to cause social change. Most
product and service innovations fall into the sustaining category, perpetuating the status
quo by providing “additional functionality for an organization’s most demanding
customer” (Christensen, Baumann, Ruggles, & Sadtler, 2006, p. 96). The status quo of a
health care system is disease management. Substantial funding in terms of programs and
buildings are dedicated to this fundamental work. Disruptive innovation would be placing
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patient safety ahead of the existing status quo as a way to create social change in health
care. Finding subsets within health care to apply disruptive innovations will shift the
paradigm to patient safety. One such subset could entail understanding the dynamics of a
near miss (NM), that is, when a health care team member prevents or stops an error from
reaching a patient.
There is debate in the literature that studying NMs will not provide significant
knowledge to prevent medical errors because the genesis of the error is hard to identify
(Weick, 2002). Conversely, the Institute of Medicine (2004) focused on two primary
reasons why detection of injuries and NMs contribute to patient safety. First, standardized
identification and reporting practices provide information for “epidemiological analysis
and comparative failure rates” (Weick, p. 178). This ranking aids in establishing research
priorities. In addition, the gathered information demonstrates (a) what changes took place
in work practices, and (b) whether expected improvements are sustainable over time
(Institute of Medicine). Each of these makes a significant contribution to fostering safer
patient care. Therefore, the intention of this study was to contribute new understanding to
the existing body of knowledge on error prevention by members of the health care team.
The primary focus was to explore the role of health care team members’ intuition in
preventing medical errors from reaching hospitalized patients. The results were organized
to make it easier for managers to talk with new employees and students about ways to
prevents errors from reaching hospitalized patients.
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Statement of the Problem
The problem addressed in this study was to explore the role of intuition on the
part of health care team members in preventing medical errors from reaching hospitalized
patients. Davenport and Prusak (2000) suggested, “knowledge that is complex and
initially tacit can be externalized and embedded” (p. 83). Health care team members
document when an adverse event (AE) occurs. However, the impediment arises in
separating knowledge, which is embedded explicitly in an organizational policy, and tacit
knowledge, which keeps the process going (J. Thomas, Kellogg, & Erickson, 2001).
What causes a health care team member to stop or prevent a medical error? The
results of analyzing 1,836 unusual occurrence reports (UORs) may assist in identifying
and documenting behaviors transferable to less experienced health care team members in
order to prevent future errors. The subsequent digital video disk containing stories
abstracted from interviews regarding error prevention by 8 health care team members
may serve as an educational tool for managers and leaders to use in changing the culture
of safety within health care facilities. Davenport and Prusak (2001) commented that
“knowledge must be transferred and absorbed; knowledge that is not absorbed has not
really been transferred” (p. 101). Storytelling is one way to transfer and absorb
knowledge (Cullen & Fein, 2005; Denning, 2001; Snowden, 1999). Themes derived from
the analysis of the interviews with health care team members may lead to further
research.
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Background of the Problem
A review of health care literature suggested that between 44,000 and 98,000
patients die each year because of medical errors (Brennan et al., 1991; Institute of
Medicine, 2001; Kohn et al., 2000; Leape et al., 1991). These figures provided a frame of
reference for estimating the number and severity of injuries to hospitalized patients
annually. The sheer volume demands further query into the causation of dramatic events
such as the catastrophic antineoplastic overdose at Dana Farber or documented cases of
wrong-site surgeries (Connor, Ponte, & Conway, 2002; Joint Commission, 2007a;
Rosenthal & Sutcliffe, 2002).
Health care regulatory agencies have focused attention on the analysis of sentinel
and preventable AEs (Institute of Medicine, 2001; Joint Commission, 2007c; Quality
Interagency Coordination Task Force, 2000). Numerous types of errors have been
identified, including adverse drug events (Beyea, 2002; Bogner, 1994; Boyle,
Schulmeister, Lajeunesse, & Anderson, 2002; Cohen, 1999; Haig, 2003; McCarter,
Centafont, Daly, Kokoricha, & Leander Po, 2003); communication breakdowns among
health care team members (Cosby, 2003; M. Davis, 2004; Joint Commission, 2006a;
Patterson, Render, & Ebright, 2002); fires in operating rooms (Morath & Turnbull, 2005);
and electronic fetal monitoring failure (Miller, 2003). Research has identified new
sources of vulnerability for health care team members that contribute to such errors,
namely, fatigue, repetitive crises, miscommunication, interruptions, and time pressures
(Morath & Turnbull).
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The impact of medical errors has a lasting consequence on patients, families,
health care team members, and society as a whole. Increased costs in health care affect
private businesses’ ability to provide coverage to their employees. This results in the
number of uninsured individuals continuing to rise exponentially each year (Institute of
Medicine, 2001; Sage, 2003; Sidorov & Schlosberg, 2005), such that the costs associated
with health care are becoming a vital part of political debates (DoBias, 2006). The factors
affecting medical errors are discussed in detail in chapter 2.
Federal and local regulatory agencies, in conjunction with health care managers
and leaders, have begun to shift the expectations and beliefs away from the normalized
deviance of accepting that errors occur. As a part of this shift, theories prevalent in other
industries have emerged in health care as best practice for studying other causative
factors, including an examination of accident causation, human factors research, and crew
resource management (Helmreich, 1999; Leonard, Graham, & Bonacum, 2004; Lyons,
Adams, Woloshynowych, & Vincent, 2004; E. Thomas et al., 2000; Wiegmann &
Shappell, 2003; Wilson, Harrison, Gibberd, & Hamilton, 1999). Major themes in human
factors have evolved as viable ways to reduce the number of medical errors from
reaching patients: (a) reduce reliance on memory, (b) improve information access, (c) use
forced functions in computers, (d) standardize tasks, and (e) reduce the number of handoffs (McClanahan, Goodwin, & Houser, 2000; Morath & Turnbull, 2005; Poniatowski,
2004; Reason, 1997).
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The first step to increasing patient safety is to recognize the contributory
dynamics behind error causation within an organization. This includes careful
examination of the anatomy of an error, decision-making practices, and communication
among health care team members, as well as system failures that lead to errors. This
transfer of knowledge, both in differentiating system error versus human error, is
fundamental to the development of a knowledge management process to improve patient
safety in health care (Quinn & Anderson, 1996). Additional research must be directed to
all aspects associated with medical errors, including NMs.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study was to understand the role of intuitive decision making
in preventing medical errors from reaching hospitalized patients. A primary focus in
health care has been to examine the root cause of identified medical errors in order to
initiate appropriate interventions and prevent future errors (Institute of Medicine, 2001;
Joint Commission, 2007b; Kohn et al., 2000). What has been missing from this critical
work is an analysis of what prevents medical errors from reaching hospitalized patients,
in particular, the role of intuition (Henneman & Gawlinski, 2004).
Research Questions
The study was guided by the following research questions:
1.

What role does the intuition of health care team members at this integrated
West Coast health care system play in preventing medical errors from
reaching hospitalized patients?
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2.

Do health care team members document constructs of intuition when
identifying near misses as compared to adverse events on unusual
occurrence reports?

3.

Are there differences in the response to medical errors by health care team
members who rate higher on the AIM Inventory at the three integrated
West Coast hospitals?
Research Hypotheses

H01: There is a difference in the mean intuitive scores of health care team
members who submitted medication-related UORs.
H02: There is a difference in the mean intuitive scores by gender of health care
team members who submitted medication-related UORs.
H03: There is a difference in the number of documented constructs of intuition for
AEs versus NMs.
H04: All the population means are equal in the low, medium, and high intuitive
scores when comparing the age of health care team members who submitted UORs
regarding medication errors.
H05: There is a difference in the low, medium, and high intuitive scores by gender
of health care team members who submitted UORs regarding medication errors.
Conceptual Support
The conceptual support for this study was based on four theories: (a) Reason’s
(1997) Swiss cheese model of defenses; (b) Jung’s (1971) personality types describing
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intuition; (c) Benner’s (1984) adaptation of the Dreyfus model of skill acquisition,
novice-to-expert, to understand the development of intuition; and (d) Welling’s (2005)
model of intuition. In discussing the general principles of human error, Reason (1997)
presented two points of reference: human versus systems. Errors made by individuals
result from factors such as absentmindedness, distraction, lack of knowledge, or fatigue.
For example, an employee may be more prone to making mistakes at the end of six
consecutive 12-hour shifts. System failures focus on conditions under which errors occur
because of processes rather than individuals within an organization (Reason, 2000).
Examples include look-alike and sound-alike medications being stored side-by-side, or
having similar packaging for a paralytic and a stimulant medication.
In a perfect world, defenses are always intact and functional, permitting no
breakthrough by potential accidents. As an example, the reader might imagine four
separate pieces of intact cardboard, standing parallel and offset, acting as a barrier to stop
or prevent medical errors from reaching patients. Those same four pieces of cardboard
look like slices of Swiss cheese. The slices of cheese or the sizes of the holes can vary,
just as daily situations shift or change; however, the presence of a hole in one layer does
not dictate a bad outcome. Reason (1997) argued that accidents occur only when “the
holes in many layers line up to permit a trajectory of accident opportunity” (p. 10). This
explains why a health care team member could examine a process at different times and
find a safe outcome one time and an AE the next time. On Monday, the Swiss cheese
holes do not line up because barriers are in place and functional, yet on Tuesday, using
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the same process, something shifts or changes, a barrier fails, the holes align the
trajectory, and an adverse outcome occurs. Reason’s Swiss cheese model is but one shift
away from blaming the individual to understanding the roles of the system, the
environment, and the individual in error causation.
Jung (1971) defined the concept of intuition through personality type. He
proposed that intuition is a cognitive event rather than an occult gift or activity outside
the individual. “In intuition, a content presents itself whole and complete, without our
being able to explain or discover how this content came into existence” (Jung, p. 453). He
also believed that all individuals have a primary orientation of either introversion or
extroversion that is elated through the four primary mental functions of cognition,
emotion, sensation, and intuition (as cited in Riso & Hudson, 1996). The differences
between the four functions are that although thinking and feeling involve judgments,
sensation and intuition do not. Intuition functions as the perception of possibilities,
implications, often at the expense of details. The perceptions of intuition are often taken
as fact, in much the same way as the person experiences sensations. The difference for
Jung was that the perceptions are just that, and may not actually be truths. This important
distinction is discussed in more detail later in this study.
What is missing from that explanation is the how intuition develops, that is, how
one learns to recognize patterns and build mental models. Benner (1984) explained this
development through her research in nursing that examined the concept of novice to
expert. Observations of professionals have demonstrated that “knowledge is gained
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through practice” (Merriam & Caffarella, 1999, p. 402). Benner’s nursing theory of
novice to expert was based on blending the individual’s experience level with theoretical
knowledge, gaining knowledge through practice. Her work supported Dreyfus and
Dreyfus’s (1986) assertion that “humans acquire skills through instruction and
experience” versus leaping from “rule-guided knowing that to experience-based knowhow” (p. 19). She described five levels in her model: novice, advanced beginner,
competent, proficient, and expert. For example, the novice nurse, who has little
experiential knowledge, may theoretically understand the etiology of a patient presenting
with a pulmonary embolus but may miss the observational onset because of a lack of
experience. The expert nurse, who has years of experience plus theoretical knowledge, is
able to identify the signs and symptoms of pulmonary embolus earlier and intervene with
appropriate action to prevent the patient’s deterioration. From Benner’s perspective, a
novice nurse has not had sufficient experience to allow intuition to play a role.
Welling (2005) presented a five-phase model of intuition based on the central idea
that intuition stems from pattern recognition, not from a source of knowledge. He
commented, “When something is a known pattern, one experiences a feeling of
recognition. When some perception is different from what one expects, one’s attention is
caught” (p. 24). He concluded that for intuition to be useful, the meaning of the
perceptions has to be understood. Conversely, Gladwell (2005) referred to pattern
recognition as thin slicing, meaning a person’s unconscious mind “finding patterns in
situations and behaviors based on very narrow slices of experience” (p. 23). In
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psychology, the term thin slicing is used in the study of nonverbal behaviors (Ambady
& Rosenthal, 1993); sales effectiveness (Ambady, Krabbenhoft, & Hogan, 2006);
accuracy of judgments in sexual orientation (Ambady, Hallahan, & Conner, 1999); and
negotiations (Curhan & Pentland, 2007).
Gladwell (2005) associated the term with intuition, that is, when the individual
synthesizes didactic knowledge with real-world experience. Epstein (1999), however,
classified this as having knowledge through experience, that is, in a “collection of
information, intuition, and interpretations that guide professional practice” (p. 834). Klein
(2003) supported Epstein’s view that expertly applying intuition comes from meaningful
experience or knowledge and allows the individual to “recognize patterns and build
mental models” (p. 36).
Welling’s (2005) model depicted the five phases or processes that a clinician uses
in the cognitive function of pattern discovery and recognition. These concepts explained
the basis of an individual’s intuitive ability; how experience develops the ability; and the
clinical processes used to reach an outcome, in the case of this study, to prevent medical
errors from reaching hospitalized patients. He suggested that intuition should be
considered a process that consists of sequenced phases with increasing amounts of
information: detection, dichotomic awareness, related object, metaphorical solution, and
explicit verbal understanding. Each phase has different modes of knowledge
representation. This is where Welling diverged from Jung (1971), namely, in his
understanding of perceptions versus information. Welling stated that “the amount of
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information contained in the intuition increases from one phase to another, thus with
each phase, the specificity of and discriminative potency of the intuition phenomenon
increase” (p. 25).
The work of Benner (1984) as well as Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) established a
framework to explain how an expert may be able to prevent a medical error from
occurring through thin slicing, pattern recognition, or an intuitive sense. This
accumulation of knowledge comes from experiences and observations over time until it
forms what this researcher terms a discerned wisdom. Welling’s (2005) model provides
five sequential phases that map a health care team member’s cognitive processes to reach
an intuitive decision. Preventing an error from reaching a hospitalized patient means that
precautions must be taken to ensure that the holes in the Swiss cheese do not align.
Intuitive thinking may provide a clear explanation of what occurs when a health care
team member recognizes an NM and thus adds new knowledge to patient safety.
Assumptions
Five assumptions come to mind when discussing medical errors and intuition.
First, humans commit errors every day. A cultural norm for high-profile professionals
within health care, such as physicians, is to focus on bad rather than peak performance
(Alexandersson, 2003). It is the degree and severity of the error that causes concern.
Second, human error may be the result of circumstances beyond the control of an
individual. In a clinical setting, system failures include such elements as similar
packaging of different products, inconsistent labeling on equipment, risky procedures
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without redundant safety precautions hard-wired into the process, or undifferentiated
storage of look-alike and sound-alike medications (Institute for Safe Medication
Practices, 2007; Joint Commission, 2006b; Morath & Turnbull, 2005).
Third, systems or processes that depend on perfect human performance are
inherently flawed (Rasmussen, 1982; Reason, 1990; Whittingham, 2004). Therefore, if it
is human nature to commit errors, and even though some errors may be the result of a
system failure, the need arises to use all means possible to identify potential errors in
order to avert a bad outcome. If intuition plays a role in preventing errors from reaching
patients, this additional mechanism would aid the health care team member in keeping
the patient safe.
Fourth, intuition is a universal phenomenon of human thought (Bastick, 1982;
Myers, 2002). All humans can experience intuitive thought. However, certain events may
preclude the individuals from the experience. Some may not be open to the idea, have not
had sufficient experience, or may become too anxious in a given situation to make use of
their intuitive skills. Finally, this study was undertaken with the assumptions that all of
the participants would comprehend the content and answer the complete inventory
honestly. In addition, the participants who were interviewed did so voluntarily in an
effort to add to the body of extant knowledge.
Scope of the Study
The intent of this study was to examine the role of intuition in preventing medical
errors from reaching hospitalized patients. This research incorporated analyzing
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voluntarily submitted UORs by surveying and interviewing health care team members
working in an integrated health care system on the West Coast. These individuals work
around the clock to care for patients in an acute care environment, including medical,
surgical, emergent, and obstetrical units; procedural areas; diagnostics; and therapeutic
and clinical areas. Workloads can be demanding when life-and-death decisions are the
primary focus. Rotating shifts, a lack of sleep, shifts with different health care team
members, new knowledge requirements, and constant demands for the most current
information about a patient’s condition can lead to medical errors.
NMs and preventable AEs focused on medication errors documented in UORs
come from multiple disciplines within health care. Generalizability of the findings may
increase when examining the potential errors identified by all members of the health care
team instead of limiting the responses to specific disciplines. Therefore, for the purposes
of this study, the health care team members included physicians, nurses, pharmacists,
respiratory therapists, students, residents, and diagnostic imaging personnel.
Because of the diversity of errors reported in treatment, equipment, or behavioral
categories, the UORs selected for analysis were limited to medication-related errors only.
Excluded from the study were unsigned medication-related UORs because of the inability
of the researcher to identify the health care team members. Besides analyzing voluntarily
submitted UORs related to medication errors, each health care team member was asked to
complete a copy of the Agor Intuition Measurement Inventory (AIM Inventory; Agor,
1984) and to be interviewed about a time when the team member prevented an error from
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reaching a hospitalized patient. The health care team members’ competencies were not
evaluated as a part of this study.
Limitations of the Study
There were three primary limitations in this study. First, the study excluded any
exploration of known medical errors in adverse or sentinel events. The literature has
reported an analysis of identified errors, causation factors, and trends (Joint Commission,
2007c). Second, because of the limited number of hospitals and participants, the data
from this study may not be generalizable to a larger population. Third, the researcher
acknowledged that the participants may not have been able to recall events accurately.
The interviews were based on the participants’ memories and perceptions of the selfreported UORs.
Definitions of Terms
Several terms are used by professionals within the health care system and by
patient safety advocates when defining medical errors. The terms identified relevant to
this study include the following:
Adverse events (AEs): Injuries caused by medical management rather than the
underlying condition that reaches a patient (Biddle & Lahaye, 2003; Brennan et al., 2004;
McCarter et al., 2003; Wilson et al., 1999). AEs may not be solely due to an error (e.g.,
the patient received the correct medication but responded differently than anticipated).
AEs run a continuum of results ranging from no adverse outcome to increased length of
stay, additional hospitalization, therapy, or transfer to a different level of care (Brennan et
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al.). One type of AE is a sentinel event or “an unexpected occurrence involving death
or serious physical or psychological injury” (¶ 2).
Agor Intuition Measurement Inventory (AIM): The AIM is a 22-question
inventory designed to “identify an individual’s present overall level of intuitive ability”
(Agor, 1989, p. 1331). The inventory has been used to analyze executives’ intuitive
decision-making capabilities in industry and health care (Agor, 1986; Familoni, 2002;
Janney, 1993; Whiting, 2005).
Error: A series of planned actions that fails to achieve a desired outcome (Fortune
& Peters, 1995; Kirwan, 1994; Perrow, 1999; Proctor & Van Zandt, 1994; Quality
Interagency Coordination Task Force, 2000; Reason, 1990; Whittingham, 2004). Errors
can occur in systems, by individuals, or in combination.
Near miss (NM): This is a term associated with classifying a type of error,
regardless of the potential outcome, that is stopped before creating a negative result for a
system or a person. Reason (1997) defined an NM as “any event that could have had a
bad consequence, but did not” (p. 118). In health care, a system or a person would
translate to the patient. Health care literature has advocated for further research pertaining
to the etiology of NMs could substantially improve patient safety efforts (Henneman &
Gawlinski, 2004; Killen & Beyea, 2003; Quality Interagency Coordination Task Force;
Rosenthal & Sutcliffe, 2002).
System errors: Errors that are determined not to be the result of an individual’s
actions, but rather the outcome of a series of actions and factors related to processes or
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structures (Goldman, 2006; Quality Interagency Coordination Task Force). Systems
encompass the work environment; human or machine interface; technology; or even a
nonphysical system such as an organizational structure (e.g., an operational procedure or
a workflow process).
Tacit knowledge: This type of knowledge is “personal, context-specific, and
therefore hard to formalize and communicate” (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, p. 59). It is
the “intimation of something hidden,” which an individual has yet to discover within the
self (Prusak, 1997, p. 144). Tacit knowledge or intuition may become so embedded that
the individual may not consciously be aware of the knowledge and, therefore, not
attentive of the need to communicate with others.
Unusual occurrence report (UOR): Facility-specific documentation of potential
or real events that occur during hospitalization. These voluntary reports are completed
and submitted either via paper or electronically. Analyses of documented UORs provide
information to managers for process improvements.
Significance and Social Change Implications of the Study
Medical errors occur daily in all types of health care arenas. The errors are not
merely about statistics and numbers; rather, there are costly human factors that require
closer examination. One such area is the human toll on patients and families who
experience an unanticipated or an untoward event. Second are the costs associated with
longer lengths of stay for hospitalization, increased levels of care, or in the rework and
waste precipitated by system failures. Third are the related human capital costs of
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identifying, intervening, and analyzing medical errors in order to prevent future
occurrences.
The Institute of Medicine (2001) estimated that medical errors cost approximately
$37.6 billion each year in this country, with $17 billion of those costs associated with
preventable medical errors. The problem is not isolated to the United States. The
Canadian Institute for Health Information reported “23,750 patient deaths per year,
generating 1.1 million added days of hospitalization, and $750 million in extra health
care spending” (as cited in Kondro, 2004, p. 2059). The Quality in Australian Health
Care study reported “81,200 preventable deaths, 1.7 million temporary or permanent
disabilities, with direct cost of $6 billion” (as cited in Siddins, 2002, p. 833). These
iatrogenic injuries and medical errors affect existing fiscal resources and human capital.
The time, money, and human resources could be spent ensuring accessibility to care for
the greater population while continuing to care for existing patients. Finding ways to
prevent medical errors is in the best interests of society as a whole.
Although self-imposed cultural norms imply that health care team members must
be perfect all of the time, mistakes still happen. Individuals need to learn from others’
errors in nonthreatening ways. Creating an environment that fosters the oral tradition of
storytelling is one such way. Snowden (1999) described how individuals acquire new
information through “ultimately forming pictures in their minds” (p. 30). Understanding
occurs when the individual links existing knowledge with new information. Davenport
and Prusak (2000) furthered this idea; “Human beings learn best from stories” (p. 81).
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The knowledge gleaned from interviewing health care team members about the role of
intuition provided a nonthreatening way to talk about preventing errors.
This study provided an avenue to depict everyday experiences of health care team
members in identifying common themes of intuition. Recording what up to this point has
been considered tacit knowledge about preventing medical errors would be moving from
socialization to internalization (knowledge creation) by documenting thin slices of
experience (intuition or pattern recognition) of health care team members (Deikman,
1998; Gladwell, 2005; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). In essence, obtaining and
documenting this knowledge would move organizations into a knowledge-creating
dimension and possibly serve as one component of disruptive innovation and social
change in health care.
Summary
Finding ways to prevent medical errors from reaching patients plays an important
role for society by lessening the human suffering and, ultimately, the cost associated with
health care. Understanding the dynamics that influence health care team members in
making daily decisions is one way of improving patient safety. Health care regulatory
agencies and patient safety advocates have focused on improving patient safety through
recognition, error reporting, root cause analysis, and publicized trended descriptions of
medical errors. Chapter 1 introduced the purpose and background of the proposed
research including the theoretical basis and study design. Chapter 2 includes the review
of literature pertaining to medical errors, human factors, cognitive learning, and intuition.
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Medical errors were defined as including action for error reduction and barriers to
creating a safe environment. The subject matter included adult learning, decision making,
and the constructs of intuition. A model of intuition taken from psychotherapy was
presented. Chapter 3 describes the quantitative and qualitative approaches to the data
collection and analysis processes. The results of the research are presented in chapter 4.
In chapter 5, conclusion, interpretations, and recommendations are reported based on the
results of the research.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction
Intuition is not easily defined (Heath, 1998; Jacobs, 1998; McCutcheon &
Pincombe, 2001; Welling, 2005). Various professionals dismiss the idea of intuition as
being unscientific and lacking an evidence base (English, 1993). Intuition is difficult to
describe because it appears on the surface as unquantifiable. Faugier (2005) offered that
intuition is neither “mysterious nor irrational, rather something to be valued as the result
of learned experiences as an expert” (p. 14).
In this chapter, the concepts of cognition, knowledge acquisition, adult learning,
and critical thinking provide a foundation to clarify the dynamics and significance of
intuition. A model of intuition from psychotherapy provides further explanation (Welling,
2005). Included is a review of intuition and gender. The primary database used in this
review of the literature was EBSCO and included searches from health care, nursing,
medicine, psychiatry, business, and sociology. Additional sources included books from
the researcher’s private library. Keyword searches included medical errors, NMs, adverse
patient outcomes, sentinel events, patient safety, error reduction, system errors, culture of
safety, medical error prevention, knowledge management, intuition, pattern recognition,
tacit knowledge, gender related to intuition, communication, human factors, personality
traits, decision-making, adult learning, novice to expert, thin slicing, cognition, and
knowledge transfer. The second half of the chapter is a review of the components found
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in medical errors, such as classification, human versus system errors, and a comparison
of error perceptions from various industries.
Intuition
Intuition is a method of processing information that differs from rational or
analytical processing (Dane & Pratt, 2007; Hall, 2002; Hogarth, 2005; Kahneman, 2003;
Kline, 2005; Osbeck, 1999; Phillips, Klein, & Sieck, 2004). Jung’s theory of
psychological types embedded intuition as part of personality rather than knowledge;
intuition was simply a “given function of humans,” embedded in perceptions rather than
details (as cited in Westcott, 1968, p. 186). Polanyi (1966) viewed human knowledge
beginning with the idea that “we can know more than we can tell,” as held in Gestalt
psychology (pp. 5-6). The major difference between Gestalt psychology and Polanyi’s
perspective is that the former viewed tacit knowledge as an impression from the retina or
the brain whereas Polanyi viewed tacit knowledge as physiological thought.
Bastick (1982) wrote that the mental activities involved in intuitive processes are
common whenever situations are too complex for logical analysis. He observed
differences between high-intuitive versus low-intuitive individuals. “High-intuitive types,
because of their confidence in the intuitive process, are prepared to take risks by
providing answers based on information insufficient for analytic solutions. In contrast,
low-intuitive types lack this confidence and demand additional information” in similar
situations (Bastick, p. 168). These differences become apparent when individuals in a
group session try to brainstorm or problem solve.

24
A study of intuition and managerial decision making recognized that the rate at
which the participants processed information influenced decision making (Dane & Pratt,
2007). The researchers defined intuition as an “inborn ability to synthesize information
quickly and effectively” (p. 33). This is supported by the theory of unconscious thought,
which states that unconscious and conscious thoughts have different characteristics,
making each mode preferable under different circumstances (Dijksterhuis, 2006). For
example, decisions made about straightforward, uncomplicated issues are processed by
conscious thought, whereas complex matters are managed with unconscious thought.
Sinclair and Ashkanasy (2005) described intuition as similar to assembling a jigsaw
puzzle. They described the process as a “non-conscious scanning of internal or memory
and external environmental resources in a non-logical, non-temporal manner in order to
identify relevant pieces of information that are fitted into the ‘solution picture’ in a
seemingly haphazard way” (p. 357).
A second study regarding intuition and decision making proposed that “decisions
often require the integration of intuition; the first answer that springs to mind when one is
required to make a decision,” despite contradictive information (Simmons & Nelson,
2006, p. 409). Simmons and Nelson studied predictions and point spread, finding that the
participants predicted intuitive options, or favorites, more often than equally valid nonintuitive alternatives or underdogs. Researchers have explained this dual processing in the
context that individuals are either unmotivated (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) or unable
because they are cognitively overloaded (Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988) to process fully
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applicable information. This inability to process applicable information, in part,
explains why someone who is physically or cognitively busy relies on processing relevant
information to make decisions by internal intuition. The inability to process differs from
Gladwell’s (2005) notion of thin slicing, which relies on pattern recognition as the
explanation for intuitive decisions.
Epstein (1999) explained the role of intuition in daily practice for health care team
members in a different way. He proposed that health care team members use a variety of
means to enhance individual ability through “moment-to-moment self-monitoring, bring
to consciousness their tacit personal knowledge and deeply held values, use peripheral
vision and subsidiary awareness to become aware of new information and perspectives,
and adopt curiosity in both ordinary and novel situations” (p. 833). He believed that this
mindfulness could be cultivated through role modeling versus explicit knowledge.
Perhaps it is this collection of mindfulness, a gathering of explicit and tacit knowledge,
which allows a member of the health care team to prevent a medical error from reaching
a patient.
Pattern Recognition
Constructivist theory maintains that learners build new knowledge based on
existing knowledge (Askell-Williams & Lawson, 2006). Smolensky (1988) expanded on
this assertion to suggest, “An individual’s ability to learn evolves from specialized neural
connections between a repertoire of potentially required responses and familiar patterns
or pattern recognition” (p. 9). Benner and Tanner (1987) defined key elements associated
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with intuition for nurses as “pattern recognition, similarity recognition, common sense
understanding, skilled ‘know-how,’ a sense of salience, and deliberative rationality” (pp.
15-16).
Klein (2001) described intuition as “dependent on the use of experience to
recognize key patterns that indicate the dynamics of a situation” (p. 31). In his research,
Klein noted that because patterns can be elusive, people often have difficulty recognizing
or describing the pattern. This inability causes people to dismiss the notion of intuition
because it appears discordant. Intuition does become somewhat difficult to describe
because it appears on the surface as unquantifiable. This may explain why a health care
team member might miss a pattern presented in a patient situation. Faugier (2005)
supported Benner’s (1984) ideas that intuition is neither “mysterious nor irrational, rather
something to be valued as the result of learned experiences as an expert” (p. 14).
Effken (2000) speculated that instead of viewing intuition as merely a cognitive
process or perception, one should consider taking a more comprehensive look at all of the
factors involved. From a health care perspective, she suggested taking into account three
perspectives: (a) cognitive process or perception, (b) information provided by the patient
or person involved, and (c) context of care. She paired this three-prong approach with an
ecological method of cognitive sciences, which described intuition as direct perception
(Hsieh, 1995; Sutherland, 2000).
Zhang and Patel (2006) used the example of symbols to clarify Gibson’s (1979)
theory. Symbols are arbitrary; however, once a symbol has an assigned meaning, the
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information becomes easily transferable to others. A black sign with skull and
crossbones signifies something dangerous; a dollar sign references money. In Gibson’s
argument, information as well as perception goes into forming an intuitive sense of a
situation. This becomes measurable in the ability to quantify information from a patient
and within the context of care. Effken (2000) proposed that by examining the three
components of perception, information, and context, intuition could become measurable
and therefore valid. The intuitive perception shifts from arbitrary into quantifiable
information. Viewed as such, intuition is information based and legitimate, providing a
plausible explanation for what occurs with an NM.
Gladwell (2005) asserted a different explanation of intuition. Gladwell saw
intuition as part of the cognitive progression that occurs quicker than a methodical
analytical process. He portrayed intuition as rapid cognition, or thin slicing, which is the
mind’s ability to “find patterns in situations and behavior based on very narrow slices of
experience” (p. 23). This explanation supported the early work of Bastick (1982), who
believed that intuition occurs more rapidly than analytical processing. Gladwell, in part,
based the notion of thin slicing on the work of Carrère and Gottman (1999) ,
psychologists who could predict, with 95% accuracy, whether a couple will remain
married by observing the “first [3] minutes of a marital conflict discussion” (p. 293). The
researchers developed a predictive model by identifying patterns of behavior. A second
example comes from Gosling, a social psychologist, who used pattern recognition to
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demonstrate personality traits by observing the inhabitants of dormitory rooms (as
cited in Gosling, Ko, Mannarelli, & Morris, 2002).
One example that Gladwell (1995) described came from a study in which the
participants had four decks of cards (two blue decks and two red decks) and $2,000 in
“fake” dollars, with the instructions to win the most amount of money (Bechara &
Damasio, 1997, p. 1293). The participants, who were monitored by observation and
electrical recording, received a monetary reward for turning over a card from the blue
deck ($100) or a card from the red deck ($50). However, there were penalties embedded
in each deck. The blue decks had twice the number of penalties. Overall, the safer way to
meet the objective of winning as much money as possible was by turning over cards in
the two red decks. The researcher discovered that the participants had to turn over an
average of 40 cards to come to the logical, analytical decision that turning over more red
cards achieved the goal of obtaining more money. However, in monitoring the
participants’ responses via electrical connections, the researchers found that the
participants “knew” within the first 10 cards which decks held fewer opportunities. The
researchers were able to document thin slicing, or finding patterns in situations and
behavior, based on narrow slices of experiences by the participants. Welling (2005) used
this same idea in his model of intuition.
Intuition and Gender
There is debate in the literature whether gender predominance plays a role in
intuition (Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, & Tarule, 1997; Cappon, 1993; Dreyfus &
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Dreyfus, 1986; Effken, 2000). Traditional thinking has posited that analytical thought
is masculine and intuition is feminine thinking (Dreyfus & Dreyfus; Faugier, 2005).
Intuition is a fundamental aspect of nursing expertise (Benner, 1984; Benner, Tanner, &
Chesla, 1992; Tanner, 2006).
Cappon (1993) studied multiple aspects of intuition in 3,000 patients and
concluded that females were not necessarily more or less intuitive than males. Rather, he
asserted, Western society, dominated by males and science, “came to distrust intuition”
(p. 42). Myers (2002) noted that “the gender gap can be easily overstated; some men are
more empathic and sensitive than the average woman…women more often base
knowledge on intuitive and personal grounds” (p. 46).
Hayes cautioned against “asserting that certain attributes or qualities of women’s
learning are innate, fixed, and uniform across situations rather than integrally connected
to a particular set of situation, social, and historical circumstances” (as cited in Hayes,
Flannery, Brooks, Tisdell, & Hugo, 2002, p. 218). The researchers warned that studying
one gender’s learning styles implicitly places that gender apart as different and infers an
opposite approach that may not exist. Regardless of gender, adults learn across a
spectrum. The concern is in focusing on the inclusiveness of one gender and the
immediacy to assume differences. Hayes et al. suggested instead that learning should be
reliant upon tracing the patterns of an individual’s leaning to sources in the system of
gender relations rather than identifying precedent of differences between males and
females.
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A Model of Intuition
Welling (2005) described intuition as a process with distinct phases of intuitive
knowledge representation that forms a sequential increase of information and knowledge
from one phase to another: (a) detection, (b) dichotomic awareness, (c) related object,
(d) metaphorical solution, and (e) explicit verbal understanding. He used the five phases
to explain intuition based on the cognitive functions of “pattern discovery and
recognition” (p. 43). He proposed that intuition should provide psychotherapists and
other professionals with the means to go beyond theory-driven activity.
The first phase, or the detection phase, involves “a sign of something dawning in
consciousness” (Welling, 2005, p. 25). Something triggers a nagging suspicion or
warning to an individual, like listening to an inner voice. Keirsey (1998) described this as
“internal attention, introspection, or internalization” (p. 332). The second phase is the
dichotomic awareness phase. For psychotherapy, Welling viewed this as a “pregestaltic
experience,” such as a lost thought or an awareness that emerges in the consciousness
(p. 25). Health care team members have described this as “something not being right” or
“missing something” (DeMott, 1995; Perry, 2000). Nurses have described this as
knowing something is wrong with the patient, even when “on paper,” the patient shows
no abnormalities or areas of concern (DeMott; McCormack, 1993; McKinnon, 2005;
Ruth-Sahd & Hendy, 2005).
The third phase, termed the related-objects phase, occurs when an individual is
able to identify objects related to the feeling of intuition (Welling, 2005). In the second
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phase, the health care team member feels that something is wrong with the related
object, which in this case is the patient’s condition, and yet may not be able to articulate
the exact cause. Coombes (2005) described this as knowing “what has happened before
you know why” (p. 9). This phase may leave the health care team member feeling
incongruent when a discrepancy arises between the verbal and nonverbal responses of the
patient: The actions do not match the words.
The fourth phase, or metaphorical solution phase, occurs when the health care
team member is able to identify such pertinent elements as similes, words, or feelings
(Welling, 2005). For psychotherapists, Welling described this phase as being able to
perceive the gestalt of the patient situation, even thought the overt meaning may not yet
be fully understood. Schön (1983) depicted this as knowing in action, which is the
accumulation of experiences built over time. For Benner (1984), this represented one
competent of being an expert nurse.
The final phase is the explicit verbal understanding phase, which occurs when the
meaning of the intuition becomes clear to the health care team member. The nagging
suspicion, pregestaltic experience, dichotomic awareness, thin slicing, or pattern
recognition coalesce to allow the health care team member to be able to verbalize
awareness or take action (Ambady, 1991; Benner, 1984; Benner & Tanner, 1987;
Gladwell, 2005; McCormack, 1992; Perry, 2000; Smolensky, 1988; Welling, 2005).
Welling’s approach in depicting intuition as a sequential increase of information and
knowledge may provide the basis to demonstrate empirically what occurs when a health
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care team member prevents a medical error from reaching a hospitalized patient. At
first, something appears discordant to an individual health care team member. With
increasing information, this elusive something continues to cultivate, finally rising to the
individual’s conscious awareness. At this point, feelings arise that often turn into explicit
verbal understanding. The health care team member takes actions to stop or prevent a
medical error. In Reason’s (1997) view, the health care team member prevents the
trajectory from aligning, thus preventing the medical error from reaching the patient.
Cognition and Learning
Health care team members assess, reassess, and make critical decisions
continuously as a patient’s condition changes. This continual input of data, information,
and results provides the basis for new knowledge and learning. Cognition is the mental
processes involved in “transforming stimulation from a physical source to a
representation of reality that will guide behavior” (Rosser, 1994, p. 2). More simply
stated cognition is the way people think (Crandall, Klein, & Hoffman, 2006).
A basic overview of the process of cognition includes understanding the
acquisition, storage, and use of knowledge, including awareness, perception, reasoning,
memory, and judgment (Benson, 1994; Crandall et al., 2006; Matlin, 2002; Reed, 2000).
The human brain makes associations with words, actions, deeds, and thoughts through
content or context. “Every piece of new knowledge that is acquired is assigned its proper
place in the taxonomies of previous knowledge and provides direction for the addition of
new increments of knowledge” (Erlandson, Harris, Skipper, & Allen, 1993, p. 20).
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Memories are stronger when presented in a variety of stimuli. The greatest recall
occurs when multiple sensory experiences, for example, vision, hearing, sound, smell,
movement, or relationships, encode a memory.
One approach (Cader, Campbell, & Watson, 2005; Hammond, 1984) described
three dimensions associated with cognition: (a) analysis, (b) intuition, and
(c) quasirationality. Analysis is an organized, deliberate, and systematic process. There is
high cognitive control evidenced through detailed logical data processing and conscious
awareness. In comparison, intuition is a rapid and unconscious manner of processing
events or data. Hammond presented this second dimension, the antithesis of analysis, as
involving low cognitive control, with rapid, disorganized data processing. As mentioned
previously, Gladwell (2005) referred to this as thin slicing, or pattern recognition. The
third area, quasirationality, is a combination of analysis and intuition. This is the “ah-ha”
moment when an idea or a concept seemingly clicks or surfaces to conscious thought.
The combination of Hammond’s intuition and quasirationality may explain what triggers
a health care team member to prevent a medical error from reaching a patient.
Nature of Learning
One way to conceptualize how individuals learn has been through a classification
of cognitive processes. Bloom (1956) articulated a model of intellectual behavior in
learning that portrays a conventional way of visualizing how students learn. He based his
model on six competencies: (a) knowledge, (b) comprehension, (c) application,
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(d) analysis, (e) synthesis, and (f) evaluation. From those competencies, Bloom worked
with other educators to identify three domains of learning: cognitive, affective, and
psychomotor (Caffarella, 2002; Clark, 1999; Donald, 2002).
The cognitive domain refers to the mental skills or knowledge the individual
acquires through observation, mastery of subject matter, problem solving, pattern
recognition, drawing of conclusions, and interpretation of new information that
incorporates a combination of Bloom’s (1956) competencies. However, missing from this
single domain is the ability to explain how a person internalizes emotional components
such as values and feelings or deals with physical movement such as psychomotor skills.
The affective domain categorizes how an individual deals with emotional content,
such as feelings, values, motivation, or attitudes. Krathwohl, Bloom, and Masia (1964)
developed an affective domain that orders learning by the principles of internalization:
(a) receiving, (b) responding, (c) valuing, (d) organizing, and (e) internalizing values.
Internalization refers to the process whereby a person’s view toward an object shifts from
a broad understanding to a point where the affect consistently guides or controls the
person’s behavior (Seels & Glasgow, 1997). This, in combination with the cognitive
domain, acknowledges pattern recognition, or the intuitive part of learning. The third
domain includes physical movement or psychomotor skills: (a) perception, (b) mindsets,
(c) guided response, (d) mechanism, (e) complex over response, (f) adaptation, and
(g) origination (Clark, 1999).
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These models traditionally have appeared in educational arenas. However, the
work is applicable to health care by providing a framework for understanding how
individuals internalize tacit or explicit knowledge. When trying to visualize how an
individual who is an expert in health care recognizes a near-miss situation, the models
provide a systematic approach to demonstrate the differences in thinking between novice
and expert. This model provides invaluable information to educators and managers in
developing new employees or students as well as explaining how health care providers
think about medical errors, including NMs, preventable AEs, or sentinel events.
There has been an emergence in business circles that a practical way to enhance
company practice is by reinfusing expert content back into the organization (Davenport &
Prusak, 2000; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). This reinfusion takes place by managing the
existing employees’ intellect and converting it to valuable information. Quinn and
Anderson (1996) described a professional as having a “distinct body of knowledge” that
includes “cognitive knowledge or know-what, advanced skills or expertise termed knowhow, systems understanding or know-why, and self-motivated creativity termed carewhy” (p. 71).
Quinn and Anderson (1996) defined cognitive knowledge, or know-what, as the
mastery of basics within a discipline. Benner (1984) defined this as a novice nurse or
someone who could articulate assessment skills, laboratory values, and disease-based
protocols. However, fundamental entry-level of skills, although essential for a nurse, is
insufficient on its own.
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Advanced skills, or expertise, include the ability of the health care team
member to “apply the rules of a discipline to complex real-world problems” (Quinn &
Anderson, 1996, p. 71). This is a secondary stage for the health care team member, when
the individual is able to incorporate the theoretical concepts with tangible experience. For
many organizations, this becomes the highest expectation of the employee. In Benner’s
(1984) model, this would be a competent nurse.
If the health care team member is able to combine cognitive knowledge with
concrete experiences and move to understanding the “cause-and-effect relationships” in a
discipline, then the individual can proceed to the “know-why” level (Quinn & Anderson,
1996, p. 71). This is an expert in Benner’s (1984) model. This is when the nurse is able to
filter or anticipate subtle interactions or unintended consequences.
The fourth level encompasses the self-motivated, creative nurse who is
continually striving for improvement. This individual is testing personal and professional
limits in an effort to find a better way of achieving a defined outcome. Nonaka and
Takeuchi (1995) presented the foundational work on knowledge creation in
organizations. For the Japanese, “knowledge means wisdom that is acquired from the
perspective of the entire personality” and places emphasis on “subjective knowledge in
combination with intuitive intelligence” (Nonaka & Takeuchi, p. 29). The researchers
believed that knowledge creation lay in the use and transfer of tacit, or intuitive,
knowledge.
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Organizations that learn to nurture self-motivated, care-why individuals or
teams are able to infuse that knowledge, expertise, and drive for excellence into the
organization. The idea is similar to placing a patient who feels faint in a supine position
with the legs above the level of the heart. This position acts as an internal blood
transfusion, quickly returning the blood back to the heart. Organizations that nurture selfmotivated and creative individuals are, in essence, giving the organization an internal
blood transfusion by returning expert knowledge back into the organization.
If intuition were really only pattern recognition and learning from experiences,
only experts on the health care team would be able to prevent a medical error from
reaching a patient. The focus then turns to the role of adult learning.
Adult Learning
Three pertinent theories regarding adult learning include behaviorism,
cognitivism, and constructivism. Behaviorism emphasizes the relationship between
stimulus and response. Cognitivism examines the mental processes of learning.
Constructivism proposes that adults construct new knowledge based on current and past
experiences.
Knowles, Holton, and Swanson (1998) outlined six areas pertaining to adult
learning in the andragogical model. Those areas specify that the learner needs to
understand why and have a self-concept, previous experience, a readiness to learn, an
orientation to learning, and internal motivation. These concepts supported the belief that a

38
decisive factor influencing learning is what the learner already knows (Merriam &
Caffarella, 1999; Novak & Gowin, 1984).
Constructivism stems from the understanding that learning is what happens to a
human being because of experience. It is the pattern recognition from these experiences
that provides a new base of learning for the individual. Changes in behavior are simply
evidence that learning has occurred. Benner’s (1984) nursing theory of novice to expert is
an example of constructivism.
Schön (1983) described a “reflective practitioner” as one who makes countless
judgments of quality without being able to describe the criteria, or who displays skills
minus the ability to depict the rules or procedures (p. 50). This is what Polanyi (1966)
depicted as tacit knowledge, that is, the quality of just knowing. Schön proposed that
health care team members are dependent upon skillful performance, tacit recognition, and
personal judgments, even in the face of evidenced-based research. The new base of
learning provides more meaning and substance because the knowledge has moved for the
individual from being theoretical to real. This learning becomes the joining of theoretical
knowledge with life experiences and, therefore, changes the individual’s perspective.
Mezirow and Associates (2000) followed a corresponding path to Schön’s (1983)
work in categorizing adult learning into three areas of gaining: (a) technical knowledge
(instrumental), (b) practical knowledge, and (c) emancipatory (self-knowledge). This
categorization supported Benner’s (1984) model of novice to expert. From these actions,
Mezirow and Associates theorized that individuals create structure or make meaning
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from experiences based on centrality of experience, critical reflection, and rational
discourse. The theory is applicable in explaining the educational process in health care,
namely, the blending of technical knowledge (i.e., didactic information) with practical
knowledge (i.e., clinical experience) that leads to emancipatory knowledge (i.e., of the
individual). The researchers took these beliefs and began forming a concept called
transformative learning, a way for the individual to change a frame of reference.
Mezirow and Associates (2000) believed that humans have an urgent need to
understand and order the meaning of events by integrating experience with existing
knowledge in an effort to avoid chaos. The researchers observed that humans are in a
constant struggle to negotiate conflicting experiences and information. An example
would be a new nurse or intern describing a growing concern over a patient’s condition in
the absence of clinical data. Individuals often utilize reflection to try to make sense of an
experience. Mezirow (1991) differentiated reflection from learning as “the process of
critically assessing the content, process, or premise of in an effort to interpret and give
meaning to an experience” (p. 104). He distinguished three levels of reflection.
First, content reflection occurs when an individual has pondered the gist or
description of a problem. Second, process reflection involves thinking about the
strategies used to solve the problem rather than the content of the problem itself, which is
an orderly progression of reflection that does not incorporate intuition. This is similar to
Dewey’s beliefs that a problem is solved when the individual feels that it has been solved
(as cited in King & Kitchener, 1994). Finally, a premise reflection leads the individual to
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question the relevance of the problem itself, as well as the assumptions, beliefs, or
values underlying the problem. This process is distinct from problem solving and can
lead to transformative learning, which distinguishes an expert from a novice (Mezirow &
Associates, 2000).
Minick and Harvey (2003) found an example of Mezirow and Associates’ (2000)
theory of reflection and transformative learning in a study where the researchers
examined early recognition of patient problems among nurses. Sixteen medical/surgical
nurses employed in an urban southern hospital described a patient-care experience in
which the nurses felt that they had made a difference. Three themes describing ways of
knowing that enabled early recognition emerged from the study: (a) knowing the patient
directly, (b) knowing the patient through the family, and (c) knowing that something is
not as expected (Minick & Harvey). From a clinical perspective, these themes appeared
logical. In each of the cases described by the participants, the nurses gained valuable
experience from previous interactions with either the patients and/or family members.
Those prior experiences led to better patient care because the nurses were able to
intercede on their patients’ behalf before problems arose. The nurses were able to process
critical information in order to interpret and give meaning to an experience. Nurses who
were not familiar with the patients might have missed the early warning signs, and the
patients’ condition would have deteriorated.
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Situated Learning
Situated learning is the study of working intelligence or the creation of practical
knowledge (Rogoff & Gardner, 1984). The advocates of situated learning have argued
that learning occurs as a function of the activity or context that it occurs, unintentionally,
and through collaboration (Lave & Wenger, 1991; Rogoff & Lave, 1999), that is, in a
social environment (Hansman, 2001). This is one explanation of how pattern recognition
begins and develops for health care team members.
Critical Thinking
There is a tendency for “individual disciplines to believe their own decisionmaking process as unique” (Buckingham & Adams, 2000, p. 981). When applying the
taxonomy of learning, it becomes apparent that there are no differences in the actual
cognitive aspects of various disciplines, only in the content. This raises the question of
whether there are two forms of critical thinking underlying the decision making of most
disciplines: analytical and intuitive (Cader et al., 2005; Hammond, 1984; Thompson,
2003). This became a central premise in the study for examining the role of intuition in a
health care team member’s identification of NMs.
Critical thinking involves multiple processes occurring simultaneously. The
process involves the ability to recognize the existence of a problem and obtain additional
information or data to assist in concluding whether acceptable evidence is available to
form a judgment (Brookfield, 1987; King & Kitchener, 1994). Traditional thinking views
physicians as making analytical and empirically based decisions, compared to nurses’
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decisions being seen as tacit, feminine, and emotional (Buckingham & Adams, 2000).
The question that arises is whether there are there differences or similarities between the
cognitive processes of different disciplines in the identification of NMs associated with
medical errors. This study will examine the participants’ responses based on gender as
well as educational preparation.
Decision Making
Defining decision making can quickly become a quagmire. Judging a decision as
good or bad at a point in time for medicine is difficult because clinical decisions often
have multiple dynamic variables that are constantly changing. A decision made using
available information may still have an undesirable outcome purely because of
probabilistic factors, insufficient data, rapidly changing physiological conditions, or
expertise of the primary person making the decision (Buckingham & Adams, 2000).
For example, “approximately 35% of heart attacks in women are believed to go unnoticed
or unreported” (Giardina, 2000, p. 350). Research has demonstrated that women do not
always present with the classic symptoms of acute myocardial infarction, that is,
crushing, substernal, left-sided chest pain. A 60-year-old female could present in a
physician’s office with symptoms of fatigue, general malaise, or ‘achy-ness’ and, in fact,
have elevated cardiac enzymes with an abnormal electrocardiogram indicative of an
evolving acute myocardial infarction. The physician may have made a decision based on
insufficient data. The symptoms presented mimicked flu-like symptoms, not myocardial
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infarction, resulting in an absence of ordered laboratory studies of cardiac enzymes,
monitoring for arrhythmias, and potential fatal misdiagnosis.
Klein (2001) presented “naturalistic decision making” (NDM), or the study of
how individuals use experiences to make decisions in the field or in clinical settings
(p. 4). After years of observing firefighters, Klein described the differences between
analytical sources of power, such as deductive logical, analysis of probabilities, and
statistical models versus NDM found in intuition or metaphors and storytelling. One
example of analytical sources of power is the decisions made in clinical trials. Klein
differentiated NDM processes as what occurs in the field. Would NDM be part of the
process involved when a health care team member identifies an NM? Would this
individual use more analytical properties rather than intuition to prevent a medical error?
As one example, Crandall and Getchell-Reiter (1993) elicited knowledge from
expert neonatal intensive care nurses on sepsis, a common malady in neonates. The initial
study detailed precise features solicited from expert nurses regarding the assessment and
care of critically ill infants. The NDM methodology allowed the researchers to abstract
nine additional indicators from the nurses: “The increase in the total number of indicators
reported in initial versus probed accounts was highly significant (t = 14.18, p < .001)” (p.
45). These nine additional indicators formulated a training guide developed for novice
nurses orienting to a neonatal intensive care unit. The recognition, abstraction, and
collection of expert awareness are examples of valuing human capital (Liebowitz &
Wright, 1999). Reclaiming and documenting expert tacit knowledge in order to reframe
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the information for others in the field to make use of is the essence of knowledge
management (Davenport & Prusak, 2000; Fuller, 2002; McElroy, 2003; Quinn,
Anderson, & Finkelstein, 1998). This study will similarly examine the evidence of
additional indicators for preventing medical errors.
The first part of chapter 2 demonstrated several concepts regarding intuition.
First, intuition is a non-gender-specific cognitive process that emerges from experiences
and takes time to develop. Intuition comes from learning, that is, pattern recognition, and
ultimately can influence critical thinking, which shapes decision making. A model of
intuition provides one way to quantify the concept. The next section provides an
overview of existing knowledge regarding human versus system error. The question
becomes one of determining how to apply the concepts in health care.
Medical Errors
The literature provides a frame of reference with an annual estimation of injury to
patients (Kohn et al., 2000). When considering all types of medical errors, “a hospital
patient can expect, on average, to be subjected to more than one medication error each
day of hospitalization” (Institute of Medicine, 2006, p. 4). Addressing the problem of
human error requires more than classifying human failings or limitations. Understanding
human errors requires examining the cause and effect as well as the tasks associated with
the error (Hobbs & Williamson, 2002).
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Skill-, Rule-, and Knowledge-Based Domains
Rasmussen (1982) delineated levels of behaviors involving human error as skill-,
rule-, and knowledge-based performance (see Appendix A). Skill-based domains include
automated, subconscious routines seen as “performance that is controlled by stored
patterns of behaviors in a time-space domain” (Rasmussen, 1982, p. 316). Errors in the
skill-based domain are “errors of action” (Biddle & Lahaye, 2003, p. 68). Errors are
associated with mechanisms such as wrong classification or recognition of situations,
erroneous associations to tasks, or memory slips in procedural recall (Johannsen, 1988;
Rasmussen, 1999; Reason, 1990; Whittingham, 2004).
An example of a skill-based domain would be the mechanical process of driving a
car. An experienced driver thinks nothing of starting a car, changing gears, or braking
because the processes have become automated steps in a frequently repeated practice. For
example, an error of omission from inattention occurs when a driver fails to signal before
making a turn. To quantify skill-based errors, Whittingham (2004) turned to the work of
Hannaman and Spurgin in determining average error probabilities under defined
conditions. The application of Hannaman and Spurgin’s work, namely, the systematic
human action reliability procedure, or SHARP, to skill-based rules errors would yield a
rate of “one error in 20,000 tasks” (as cited in Whittingham, p. 16).
In comparison, rule-based behavior pertains to retained relevant rules. This is a
more complex or less familiar task than those using skill-based behaviors. Rule-based
errors occur when someone (a) applies a wrong rule in a particular situation, or
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(b) misapplies a good rule redundantly. Comparatively, error probability for rule-based
behavior would be on average “one error in 2,000 tasks” (Whittingham, 2004, p. 16).
An example of a rule-based error in health care would be the application of a twopart identifier for medication administration. The rule in a fundamental way makes sense.
A health care team member uses two separate patient identifiers prior to medication
administration for hospitalized patients. The two identifiers could include the patient’s
name and date of birth. At face value, this process seems to be a pragmatic approach to
preventing wrong medication administration. However, the rigidity and redundancy of
the rule when applied to a nurse asking the same patient in one consistent 8-, 10-, 12-, or
16-hour shift in which neither the patient’s name or date of birth changes, can lead to a
rule-based performance error when the nurse skips the rule and administers a medication
to the wrong patient. Helmreich (2000) categorized this as a procedural error whose
intention is correct but execution is flawed. In contrast, Reason (1990) called this an
execution failure.
In health care, an example of rule-based behavior would be a nurse adhering to
the procedural requirements for a two-person verification of blood products before
administering to a patient. National standards require strict adherence to procedural
double checks (New York State Department of Health, 2004). This process begins with
the phlebotomist drawing a sample of the patient’s blood to type and cross match through
two licensed personnel, both verifying a patient by name, date of birth, and blood type
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before administering a blood product. A nurse failing to follow national standards and
organizational procedure would demonstrate a rule-based error.
Knowledge-based behavior is adopted when a completely novel situation is
presented for which no stored rules, written or otherwise, exists, but which requires that a
plan of action be formulated (Biddle & Lahaye, 2003; Reason, 1990). By comparison,
error probability for knowledge-based behavior is on average “one error in 200 tasks”
(Whittingham, 2004, p. 17). Helmreich (1999) categorized this as an operational decision
error, in which an individual or a group makes discretionary decisions that unnecessarily
increase risk. Differences among the three areas appear in Appendix B.
Slips, Lapses, and Mistakes
In his study of human error, Reason (1990) explained aberrancies in mental
functioning leading to errors based on skill-, rule-, or knowledge-based behaviors as
slips, lapses, and mistakes. Slips and lapses occur with interrupted automatic behavior,
lack of attention, or an execution failure (Norman, 1988; Rasmussen, 1982; Reason,
1990). Mistakes result from conscious deliberations. Mistakes are rule- or knowledgebased errors that “involve a decision resulting in action or lack of action” (Kennedy,
2004, p. 117). Reason (1997) viewed mistakes as the result of planning failures. The
causal taxonomy begins to focus on identifying the root cause associated with the error
(Reason, 1997).
Reason (2000) viewed errors as stemming from one of two sources: personal or
system failure. In the personal or human approach, errors occur because of anomalous
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mental processes, such as forgetfulness, carelessness, lack of motivation, or lack of
attention to detail. The natural actions applied to these types of errors, Reason observed,
are the traditional managerial responses such as disciplinary measures; writing of a
policy/procedure; additional training; and threat of litigation, blaming, or shaming. In
health care, errors lead not only to harmful consequences experienced by patient and
health care team member but also to additional expenditures because of complications
(Brennan et al., 2004; McCarter et al., 2003).
In the system failure approach, the fundamental assertion that humans are fallible
and errors are to be expected is seen as the normative deviance current in health care.
“Errors are seen as consequences rather than causes, having their origins not so much in
the perversity of human nature as in the upstream systematic factors” (Reason, 2000,
p. 768). Countermeasures would look at changing the system to prevent further errors by
using tools such as failure mode effects criticality and analysis, process mapping, and
Kaizen or Lean thinking (Womack & Jones, 2003).
Whittingham (2004) made a valid point regarding human error, “It needs to be
understood that even with the best possible systems in place, human error will never be
entirely eliminated” (p. 9). He argued that there would always be some level of
unpredictable error. Therefore, this becomes fundamentally imperative that error proofing
take place in planning new applications, systems, or processes to reduce the risk of error
to a tolerable level when evaluated against the benefits of the activity (Perrow, 1999;
Whittingham).
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Taxonomy of Error Types
Reason (1990) proposed that composition, intent, and delineation form the
framework for understanding the anatomy of an error. First, the composition of an error
contains three components: (a) the nature of the task and the ensuing environmental
conditions, (b) the mechanisms governing performance, and (c) the disposition of the
individual involved in the error (Reason). Compare the following scenarios. In the first
scenario, a surgeon prepares for the first case of the day, namely, the insertion of a duallumen catheter for antineoplastic administration, in a familiar surgical setting
representing the nature of the task. A full complement of ancillary staff, equipment, and
supplies awaits the surgeon for the procedure or the mechanisms governing performance.
The surgeon had a good night’s sleep before the relatively low-risk procedure and has
plenty of time to accomplish the task, as seen in the disposition of the individual.
In the second scenario, the same surgeon, paged to the coronary intensive care
unit (CICU) amid resuscitation procedures, makes the determination to perform a surgical
procedure to stabilize the patient’s condition. Because of the patient’s debilitated state,
the surgeon will complete the procedure in the CICU rather than move to the main
operating room. The surgeon is not as familiar with CICU staff or equipment; and she
asks for several supplies that are not readily accessible. This was the fourth surgical case
of the day for the surgeon, who has not taken a break in over 12 hours. The physician is
tired and hungry. The two scenarios illustrate how a change in the composition of a
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situation can lead to a potential error. Each part plays an integral role in determining if
an error may occur.
The second component is the intention associated with an error. Reason (1990)
described this as an intentional versus an unintentional act when an individual diverts
attention to something other than the job at hand. Intention has two facets, that is, an
expression of the desired end state, or the means by which something is to be achieved.
Whittingham (2004) described this differently as the balance between random and
systematic errors.
Third is the idea that a planned action can proceed but still be considered an error
if the process fails to accomplish the intended outcome. Reason (1990) described the
difference in this way: “The problem resides in the adequacy of the plan rather than in the
conformity of its constituent action to some prior intention” (p. 8). If the intention is not
appropriate, it is a mistake; if the action is unintended, it then becomes termed a slip or a
lapse (Rasmussen, 1982; Reason; Whittingham, 2004). Reason’s point was that the two
concepts have different ramifications for corrective action, and he noted that this could be
a difficult discernment for managers.
The importance of documenting AEs or medical errors over time can assist
managers to identify patterns or trends related to errors. A pattern of slips or lapses by a
single individual may require additional education, time with a preceptor, or a
combination of the two actions. Expert health care team members also may not realize
the significance of explaining pattern recognition to the neophyte when a critical event is
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occurring, such as a potential medical error. The expert acts without a clear
explanation of the “why” involved in the actions. It may take neophyte health care team
member years to make the same associations based on experience.
Human Error
Human Error Versus System Failures
There are varieties of ways to conceptualize how humans make errors. Concepts
having to do with individual behaviors were discussed previously. Other conceptual
approaches recognize the role of systems and environments in error causation. Dekker
(2002) proposed a new viewpoint regarding human error as a symptom of deeper trouble
within an organization or system. “To explain failure, do not try to find where people
went wrong. Instead, investigate how people’s assessments and actions would have made
sense at the time, given the circumstances that surrounded them” (Dekker, p. 59).
Ergonomic Perspective
From an ergonomic view, the individual is seldom the solitary cause of an error.
Human performance involves multifaceted interactions among the work environment, the
person, and the tools or machines involved in the activity. Components do not work in
isolation; they require a combination of occurring events to cause an error (Whittingham,
2004). This is similar to describing a system failure. An example is research conducted at
the Japan Railways (JR) East division on human error analysis. The division is part of JR,
a government-subsidized group of eight private companies that took over the
government-owned Japanese National Railways in 1987. Chiba, Aonuma, and Kusugami
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(2003) adapted a multifaceted method of analysis on the causes that induce human
error. The company had undertaken to achieve zero injury or death of passengers, and
zero fatal accidents to staff. To accomplish this, Chiba et al. sought to obtain an accurate
assessment of each accident and to understand the basic cause, what the researchers
termed the “seeds of accident” (p. 59). This model is similar to a root cause analysis in
asking the question ‘why’ multiple times in order to ascertain the root cause (Latino,
1994). The researchers used an assessment tool that included filtering contributing factors
through eight categories: (a) causes of the error classified as human, machine, media, or
management, and (b) preventive measures, sorted as education, engineering,
environment, or enforcement.
Aeromedical Perspective
The aeromedical perspective sees errors from a mental or a physiological view as
merely a symptom of underlying fatigue or illness. The belief is that some symptoms are
suppressed until triggered by something environmentally, which then causes an error
(Alexandersson, 2003; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). One study compared interns
working 79 hours per workweek to interns working 62 hours per workweek. The study
demonstrated a 36% higher error rate among the interns working longer hours (136
versus 100 errors per 1,000 patient days, p < .001; Landrigan et al., 2004).
Organizational Perspective
The organizational perspective on human error stems from industry. Heinrich
(1959), a safety pioneer, presented the domino theory of accident causation after
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reviewing and classifying 75,000 industrial accidents. He found that unsafe acts caused
88% of industrial accidents, unsafe conditions caused 10%, and the remaining 2% were
unavoidable. From these data, he formulated his theory of accident causation based on
basic and intermediate causes.
Picture a series of dominos set in a line, not touching. Each domino represents an
aspect of an accident: (a) safety lapse or lost control, (b) basic causes, (c) intermediate
causes, (d) accident, and (e) injury. Heinrich’s (1959) theory stated that accidents result
from a chain of sequential events, metaphorically like a line of dominos. When one of the
dominos falls, it triggers the next and then the next, leading to an injury (Batson, Ray,
Wan, & Weems, 2000; Harriss, 2004; Heinrich; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003).
Removing a key factor such as an unsafe condition or act prevents the start of the chain
reaction. Heinrich viewed accidents as unplanned and uncontrolled events, always
instigated by a human being. This is in direct opposition to the ergonomic perspective.
Criticism of Heinrich’s work has included his oversimplification of the control a person
has in causing accidents (Abdelhamid & Everett, 2000) and the idea that management
had no influence over prevention (Harriss).
Bird and Loftus (1976) adapted Heinrich’s (1959) work by including management
as a fundamental piece of the equation. Adams (1976) modified Bird and Loftus’s work.
Leamon (2006) believed that Adams kept management’s role in the cascade by adding
more emphasis on the objectives, structure, and operation of the organization as
contributing factors to accident causation.
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Reason (2000) advanced the theory by shifting the emphasis away from a
cascading effect into what he termed the Swiss cheese model. He believed that defenses,
barriers, and safeguards are strategic in preventing accidents. “We cannot change the
human condition, but we can change the conditions under which humans work” (Reason,
p. 769). He saw defensive layers as (a) technological barriers in devices such as alarms or
automatic shutdown systems, or (b) human barriers, as seen in the relationship between
the copilot and the pilot or the anesthesiologist and the surgeon.
Summary
Human error in health care is a complex, multifaceted phenomenon. A paradigm
shift in existing beliefs regarding medical errors is needed. Foremost would be an effort
to reduce the organizational stigma associated with error by moving from a culture of
blame. Establishing a blame-free environment in health care will take a major
realignment for senior leaders and managers. To accomplish this, three things must occur.
First, establishing a blame-free environment would change leadership’s attitudes
regarding employee actions when mistakes or mishaps occur. Investigating errors in a
traditional model of stated facts associated with the event is inadequate. Applying
Helmreich’s (1999) threat-and error-management model provides a comprehensive way
for a manager to ascertain the cause-and-effect relationship that precipitated the event.
Second, applying Reason’s (1997) Swiss cheese model to event investigation would
provide a visual representation of causal factors and failed barriers contributing to the
error. Using Reason’s model, managers could determine whether the contributing factors
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associated with the event are system, human, or a combination of the two. This would
provide clear direction for creating action plans and interventions to prevent additional
errors.
Third, there is a need for research focused on trends or patterns that occur when
health care team members prevent errors from reaching patients (Henneman &
Gawlinski, 2004: Killen & Beyea, 2003; Minick & Harvey, 2003). One approach could
examine health care team members’ experiences with NMs to establish themes and then
apply the identified themes to Helmreich’s (1999) and Reason’s (1997) models in
accident causation and management. A second approach would be to apply Welling’s
(2005) model with trended themes from health care team members’ comments to
understand how pattern recognition or intuition prevent errors from reaching patients.
Research has demonstrated minimally four primary barriers that contribute to the
marked failure of health care institutions to improve the culture of safety: (a) clinical
autonomy among disciplines, (b) fear of litigation resulting in punishment, (c) inadequate
dissemination of known safety practices, and (d) institutional hierarchies (Rosenthal &
Sutcliffe, 2002). To this end, the researcher suggests that patient safety may benefit from
additional research into the critical thinking practices of health care team members;
decision-making skills, both individually and in teams; and the role of intuition in health
care team members’ recognition of potential errors.
This chapter addressed the composition and classification of errors, human versus
system failures, theories of accident causation, and error analysis. A description and
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model of intuition presented five phases to depict the process that health care team
members experience in pattern recognition. Comparisons of human error concepts from
aerospace, railway, and engineering to health care demonstrated commonalities among
the practices and processes. Chapter 3 examines the methodological approach used to
understand the role of intuition in preventing medical errors from reaching hospitalized
patients, including Welling’s (2005) five-phase model of intuition and Agor’s (1984)
work in depicting a way to measure intuition. The data selection describes the three
sequential ways the researcher explored the role of intuition for health care team
members in three West coast acute care hospitals.

CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHOD
Introduction
Understanding the dynamics involved in preventing medical errors comes from
analyzing health care team members’ real-world experiences of recognizing that
something is wrong and stopping the process. Two examples of how this phenomenon
can be explained come from different disciplines. Gladwell’s (2005) description of thin
slicing was one plausible explanation of the phenomenon. Welling’s (2005) model
provided a conceptual framework of the processes involved in intuition. Quantifying
narrative portions of UORs for intuitive thought and establishing a numeric score of
intuition for health care team members may be insufficient to understand the depth and
breadth of this process. To investigate the role of intuition in medical error prevention, a
qualitative approach of listening to health care team members describe events related to
NMs provides the opportunity to look for commonalities or themes within the
experiences as depicted by the health care team members. Therefore, a sequential
exploratory quantitative and qualitative model was employed.
The researcher described the research design and methodology of the study
(Walden University Institutional Review Board approval #03-21-08-0189989), sample,
sampling process, data collection, and analysis. Additional information from the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) is relevant to this study and is
included because of the stories relayed by health care team members regarding patients’
experiences.
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Research Design
This exploratory research was divided into three parts. First, the narrative portions
of existing medication-related UORs were analyzed for intuitive content. Second, health
care team members who signed the analyzed UORs were sent an inventory designed to
establish their intuitiveness scores. The third part of the research involved interviewing
members of the health care team who submitted medication-related UORs and who
volunteered to talk about times when they prevented medical errors from reaching
hospitalized patients.
A causal-comparative design can be used when attempting to determine rationale
or foundation for existing conditions (Dundam, 2003). This type of design involves the
use of “pre-existing or derived groups to explore differences between or among those
groups on outcome or dependent variables” (Schenker & Rumrill, 2004, p. 117). In this
case, the preexisting group comprised the health care team members who completed
medication-related UORs during a specific timeframe. The analyzed UORs were
classified and divided into two groups, NMs versus AEs, to compare the differences
between the documented intuitive constructs. The UORs were classified by the severity
of the event or outcome on a continuum of no incident to error/death. These categories
were developed by the National Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting
and Prevention (2001), which created an algorithm to determine the severity of an error
based on the outcome:
1.
2.

Category A: Error had the capacity to cause incident.
Category B: Error occurred, but did not reach patient.
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3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Category C: Error reached the patient but did not cause harm.
Category D: Error resulted in need for increased person monitoring.
Category E: Error resulted in need for treatment or intervention.
Category F: Error resulted in increased or prolonged hospitalization.
Category G: Error resulted in permanent person harm.
Category H: Error resulted in near-death event (e.g., anaphylaxis or
cardiac arrest).
Category I: Error resulted in person’s death. (p. 1)

Applied ethnography research typically has been defined by the subject matter,
which is a study of the ethnos or culture of a discernible group (Burns, 2000; Chambers,
2000; Cohen, Kahn, & Steeves, 2000; Creswell, 1998; Marshall & Rossman, 2006;
Moustakas, 1994). Ethnography provides a mechanism to study observable patterns of
human behavior, which in this case was the health care team members’ documentation of
actual or potential medical errors. In ethnography, the researcher looks for the individuals
most knowledgeable regarding a defined group’s explicit standards and values. In this
study, the discernable groups were health care team members working in three acute care
hospitals on the West Coast. The culturally specific accepted standard of communication
was the UOR (Kohn et al., 2000).
Researchers using ethnography examine facets of social order, in this case, a
small subset of health care team members volunteered to describe times when medical
errors were prevented. The rationale for using this approach was threefold. First, this
approach documented recognizable structures of behavior, namely, the prevention of
medical errors reaching patients (Gubrium & Holstein, 2000). Second, this process
allowed the researcher to examine the motivation regarding medical error prevention, for
example, did the motivation arise from personal values or the group norm? Third, this
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method provided a glimpse into the health care team members’ practical reasoning and
decision-making skills.
The researcher used nonstructured, open-ended questions to solicit the stories of
how health care team members prevented a medical error from reaching patients (Agar,
1986; Chambers, 2000). This type of questioning was selected to gain insight into the
tacit knowledge of the practitioners in preventing medical errors. Cognitive interviewing
focuses on “revealing patterns of cultural construction with in a target group that vary
from the interpretations of that group by outsiders, and most particularly by those who
have some authority over the group under study” (Chambers, p. 857).
Study Sample
The target population comprised health care team members working in acute care
facilities in the United States. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2008)
estimated that there are approximately 12 million health care workers in the United
States. Studying a population of this size has inherent problems. In addition, a second
problem was noted in the lack of standardized definitions for UORs. Therefore, the study
sample was selected from three hospitals that are part of an integrated health care system
located on the West Coast of the United States. The size of the study became manageable
because the three hospitals use standardized definitions of the UOR.
The three hospitals provide acute care services, including medical, surgical, and
obstetrical services; emergency care; and home community services. There is one
medical staff for the three hospitals, so physicians may have privileges to practice at all
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three facilities. Each facility has established medical residencies and student programs
in nursing and pharmacy. The primary differences among the three hospitals are bed
capacity, neonatal care, inpatient behavioral health services, and advanced cardiovascular
services. All health care team members participating in the study were employed by the
integrated health care system and were working in one or more of the three acute care
facilities during the study. The sampling frame came from the health care system’s
existing internal standardized UOR system.
Sampling Procedure
The integrated health care system has an established voluntary incident reporting
system whereby unusual occurrences are reported electronically or via paper by all
disciplines such as nursing, pharmacy, or radiology (see Appendix C). A governing
policy for the organization defines when an occurrence should be reported. The UOR
information is stored electronically in an access database. Signature of the reporting
health care team member is optional. The UOR system provides structured questions
regarding five areas: medications falls, treatment related, environmental, including
equipment-related occurrences, or behavioral concerns. There is a growing concern in
health care regarding medication-related errors (Beyea, 2002; Cohen, 1999; McCarter et
al., 2003; Morath & Turnbull, 2005). For the purposes of this study, only medicationrelated UORs were analyzed. This criterion-based sampling included 6 months’ worth of
signed medication-related UORs, a total of 1,836, from the three hospitals.
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This purposive sampling was selected based on the personal and professional
knowledge of the researcher, the accessibility and availability of the data, and the
researcher’s acknowledgment of the lack of generalizability to a wider population
(Babbie, 2004; Burns, 2000). The UOR is a traditional mechanism found in hospitals to
communicate potential or real medical errors (Morath & Turnbull, 2005). The
documentation was analyzed for trends or patterns in order to fix clearly identified
problems and prioritize improvement projects. The health care team members selected to
receive the AIM Inventory (Agor, 1984) came from the 710 submitted medication-related
UORs that were signed. Volunteers from this same group also were solicited to
participate in the audio- and videotaped interviews. This decision was based on the
supposition of the researcher that individuals who had documented potential and real
medical errors were willing to talk openly about a time when they had prevented such
errors from reaching hospitalized patients.
Instrumentation
Jung believed that human behavior is not arbitrary, but “predictable and therefore
classifiable” (as cited in Kroeger & Thuesen, 1988, p. 10). Jung (1971) observed that all
human beings are related in the four mental functions of thinking, feeling, sensation, and
intuition. Briggs and Meyers took Jung’s principles into a practical application with the
development of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI; Keirsey, 1998; Kroeger &
Thuesen). The mother-daughter team created a psychometric questionnaire that revealed
an individual’s personality type using Jungian concepts. By adapting the MBTI, Agor
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(1984) created a tool to measure both an individual’s potential intuitive ability and
whether that ability is used on the job to guide management decisions. He studied
executives from the private sector, emergency preparedness military personnel,
community college presidents, state health and rehabilitative services managers, city
managers, state legislators, and professional civil servants (Agor, 1986). Agor’s (1984)
decision to use questions from the MBTI was based on the inventory’s high reliability
and validity.
Agor (1984) focused on the domain of intuition because he felt that it is how
managers make decisions. He substituted thinking for sensing to make it easier for the
participants in management positions to relate to daily work. By focusing on the domain
of intuition, Agor (1986) decreased the total number of questions from 93 to 22, which
made the inventory more manageable. He believed that the shorter instrument would
contribute to an increase in the overall response rate.
The first section consists of 12 questions that measure the potential for making
intuitive decisions. The number of “a” responses are totaled for Questions 1, 3, 5, 6, and
11; the number of “b” responses are tallied for the remaining questions. The “a” and “b”
totals are summed to give an intuitive score. A maximum score is 12; 8 to 11 denotes a
high score, 4 to 7 denotes an average score, and 1 to 3 denotes a low score for decision
type. The researcher chose this instrument because of its applicability in multiple settings
by various disciplines and its proven high level of reliability and validity as a test
instrument (Briggs Meyers, McCaulley, Quenk, & Hammer, 1998). Multiple studies have
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confirmed the efficacy of the MBTI as equivalent for decision making (Dane & Pratt,
2007; D. Davis, Grove, & Knowles, 1990; Familoni, 2002; Janney, 1993; Whiting, 2005).
The second part of the inventory focuses on 10 additional questions regarding the
actual use of intuitive ability. These 10 questions were designed to obtain information
related to (a) actual use of intuition, (b) when and where the use of intuition is the most
utilitarian, (c) secrecy of use, (d) factors that impede, and (e) techniques used to facilitate
intuitive decision making (Agor, 1984). Answers were grouped according to use of
intuition, use versus nonuse, and secrecy of use (open vs. closed). Agor tested this portion
of the instrument by selecting executives who had scored high on the previous questions.
Based on these findings, Agor revised the inventory to clarity the questions. When
compiled, the two parts of Agor’s inventory measure an individual’s intuitive decisionmaking style and use of intuitive ability. The researcher chose this inventory because of
these underlying factors, which may explain how health care team members make
decisions to prevent medical errors from reaching hospitalized patients.
To establish reliability and validity, the researcher field tested the AIM Inventory
(Agor, 1984) with 5 health care team members not involved in the study prior to
conducting the research. These individuals were asked to take the MBTI, which was
scored by an individual certified in the process. Next, the health care team members were
asked to take the AIM Inventory. Feedback was solicited from these individuals on the
clarity of the directions and questions. The results of the AIM Inventory were compared
with the results of the MBTI to establish validity. The individuals were then asked to take
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the AIM Inventory one more time 30 days later to establish reliability through testretest (Burns, 2000; Henderson, 2006).
For the qualitative portion of the study, each health care team member was asked
to describe a time when the person prevented a medical error from reaching a
hospitalized patient. The purpose of asking the open-ended questions was to facilitate the
health care team member’s memory of the event and to stimulate his or her thoughts
about what triggers or ideas may have contributed to stopping the error. “Knowledge is
communicated most effectively through a convincing narrative that is delivered with
formal elegance and passion” (Davenport & Prusak, 2000, p. 81). In other words, what
was different about the patient or the event that stimulated a behavioral change for the
health care team member to prevent a medical error from reaching a patient? The
questions arose from the researcher’s curiosity to understand the basis of the health care
team member’s actions in preventing a medical error.
Each interview had the potential to be audio- and videotaped. To facilitate the
storytelling, the researcher asked open-ended questions as a starting point for the
interviews:
1.

In your own words, what is a medical error?

2.

How would you describe a medical error?

3.

Tell me about a time when you prevented or stopped a medical error from
reaching a patient.

4.

Tell me what was significant in your mind about this medical error.
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5.

What factors contributed to your stopping or preventing the error from
reaching the patient?
Data Collection

Six months’ worth of UORs were downloaded from the hospitals’ databases and
stored securely on the researcher’s password-protected computer. The data were sorted
by category outcome, with all Category A and B UORs placed in one group, designated
as NMs, and all Category C through I UORs be placed in a second group, designated as
AEs. It is possible that one health care team member could have submitted two or more
medication-related UORs in the period selected by the researcher. Therefore, UORs
signed by health care team members were included in only one group, but not both. The
randomization of which group was determined by a coin toss.
In the second part of the research, health care team members who had submitted
signed medication-related UORs were ask to complete the AIM Inventory and
demographic information, which generated an individual intuitive score (Agor, 1984; see
Appendixes D & E). Permission to use the inventory was granted (see Appendix F). An
introductory letter, informed consent, an inventory, and a return envelope were sent to a
work address, requesting that the individuals complete the inventory measuring intuition
versus thinking and return within 7 days (Agor; see Appendix G). Every attempt was
made to ensure a representative sampling from each hospital. An e-mail reminder,
including a copy of the inventory to print, were sent 5 days later in order to facilitate
obtaining a higher response rate of 50% to 60% for the mailed survey (see Appendix H).
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Incomplete inventories were excluded from the analysis. For the qualitative portion of
the research, health care team members were solicited for 30-minute interviews at times
convenient for them. Each member that participated was sent a copy of the transcript
from the interview to verify the accuracy of the content. The health care team members
who participated were asked to return for subsequent interviews if supplementary
questions or clarification became apparent during the ongoing analysis.
Data Preparation
Table 1 presents the constructs related to intuition developed by the researcher
and based on the literature review. The researcher quantified the total number of
narrative-documented items related to intuition from the selected medication-related
UORs, both AEs and NMs. Each construct was assigned a value of 1. Every UOR was
assigned a numeric value of 0 to 10 for a total number of intuition-related constructs. To
test the reliability of the researcher to abstract the constructs of intuition correctly,
another health care team member not involved in the study abstracted a random sample of
responses. The results were compared for interrater reliability. Quantifying the narrative
responses of health care team members who submitted medication-related UORs allowed
the events to be portrayed, described, and measured.
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Table 1
Constructs of Intuition
Construct of intuition
Pattern recognition: involves a process in which
environmental stimuli are matched with some deeply held,
non conscious category, pattern, or feature.

References
Benner, 1984; Cappon, 1993; Dane & Pratt,
2007; Gladwell, 2005; Isenberg, 1989;
Klein, 2003; Tanner, 2006; Westcott, 1968.

Memories: The appearance of meaningful visual images,
words, memories, or kinesthetic sensations; thin slicing or
detecting traits from mere second of behavior.

Bastick, 1982; Gladwell, 2005; Myers,
2002; Welling, 2005.

Hunches in selection and memory tasks.

Dane & Pratt, 2007; Klein, 2003; Welling,
2005; Westcott, 1968.

Gut feeling in decisions.

Welling, 2005.

The first impression of a person’s trustworthiness.

Welling, 2005.

Inner knowing: One’s knowledge of what is good for
oneself.

Welling, 2005.

Warnings: Uncanny feelings, a foresight of danger that
afterward proves justified.

Phillips et al., 2004; Welling, 2005.

Sense of solution: The incubation phenomenon, the sudden
appearance of a solution at an unexpected moment; a
feeling that a solution is pending, without knowing which,
or knowing that there is a better solution than the present
one.

Isenberg, 1989; Welling, 2005.

Something is wrong: Knowledge that something about a
solution is wrong or lacking; acts of recognition.

Dane & Pratt, 2007; Klein, 2003; Welling,
2005.

Knowing that a certain direction is promising; the capacity
for direct, immediate knowledge prior to rational analysis;
the instant parallel processing and integration of complex
information streams.

Agor, 1989; Myers, 2002; Welling, 2005.

There are three primary steps involved in data coding: (a) reducing raw data into a
manageable form, (b) displaying the data once reduced, and (c) drawing conclusions or
verifying (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Data reduction entails selecting, simplifying,
abstracting, and transforming the raw data. Data display is the organized assembly of

69
information that allows the researcher to draw conclusions. During this phase, the
researcher gradually developed a small set of generalizations. In the final stage, the
researcher drew meaning from the raw data for comparison to formalized constructs or
theories to develop conclusions (Auerbach & Silverstein, 2003; Gibbs, 2004; Miles &
Huberman; Richards, 1999).
The researcher began the coding process by employing Welling’s (2005) five
phases of intuitive knowledge representation to establish the basis organization for
coding, namely, detection, dichotomic awareness, related objects, metaphorical solution,
and explicit verbal understanding. This primary schema provided the framework to
categorize the text from the transcripts and begin the search for patterns within the
structure (Auerbach & Silverstein, 2003). From there, the researcher looked for other
natural thematic groupings of words or phrases.
For the interviews, the analysis included identifying common themes from the
transcribed interviews by (a) creating short phrases or sentences that reflect a single,
specific thought; (b) pulling group statements into meaningful units; (c) seeking
divergent perspectives; and (d) constructing a composite or overall description of the
phenomenon as people typically experience it (Gibbs, 2004; Leedy & Ormrod, 2001).
The themes that emerged from the coded interviews were compared to Welling’s (2005)
five phases of intuition to the participants’ responses and progression through the phases.
The researcher clustered the experiences into categories, much the way an affinity
diagram does in organizing random, brainstormed ideas for quality improvement
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processes. These clusters of meaning were analyzed and tied together to create a
general description of the experience (Agar, 1986). A pivotal point in this process was the
researcher’s ability to set aside personal, preconceived notions about the content and
responses during the process. The emerging themes were tested for face validity with
other health care team members not associated with the study.
Data Analysis
The basis for data analysis in an exploratory study is to describe or draw a picture
of the results. Thus, descriptive statistics, including measures of central tendency and
frequency distributions, were used to analyze the demographic information of the
participants and the UORs (Babbie, 2004; Burns, 2000; Henderson, 2006). Participant
demographic information was analyzed by age, gender, educational preparation, number
of years licensed, and number of years in discipline. The UORs were analyzed by
hospital, reporting unit, disciple of health care team member, category, causation factors,
time of day, and day of the week. An exploratory study describing the role of
computerized physician order entry or electronic order entry in facilitating medication
errors used descriptive statistics to summarize and present the findings (Koppel et al.,
2005). Chi-square evaluates the “independence or alternatively the association of
frequency counts in various categories” (Burns, p. 212). In the current study, chi-square,
or nonparametric test of significance, was used to analyze the nominal data elements of
gender, discipline, and type of UOR.
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A t test was used to compare the results from the interval level of measurement
for the AE group compared to the NM group on documented constructs of intuition and
the means scores of intuition. This statistical technique was chosen because it is the most
appropriate test to use when comparing a continuous outcome variable in two
independent groups (Henderson, 2006; Triola, 2002). ANOVA was used to test “the
equality of three or more populations means by analyzing sample variances” (Triola,
p. 525).
A subset of the two groups was examined: (a) high-intuitive health care team
members who reported NMs, (b) high-intuitive health care team members who reported
AEs, (c) health care team members who were not high intuitives who reported NMs, and
(d) health care team members who were not high intuitives who reported AEs. Highintuitive health care team members’ responses were examined for predictors of intuition
and phases of intuition trended in the audio- and videotaped interviews against age, years
of experience, discipline, and gender. As an example, Whiting (2005) surveyed 113
health care executives in the United States about intuitive decision-making and leadership
styles. In the analysis, she used chi-square and ANOVA statistical tests to evaluate the
relation between intuitive decisions and leadership style, age, gender, and size of
company where the executives were employed at the time of the study. She found no
relationship between intuitive decision making and age, gender, size of company, or
leadership style.
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Traditionally, audio-recorded responses required transcription and coding
before analysis of the content could occur. Hutchinson (2005) proposed an “innovative
method of data analysis that uses audio-editing software from selected audio bytes in
digital audio recordings” (p. 20). Gold Wave 5.18, a professional digital audio editor, is
user friendly and economical. The advantages of processing the data in the medium in
which they are collected include saving transcription costs, saving time, and enhancing
validity (Hutchinson). The coded audio files could be stored for further analysis.
Transana, software designed for qualitative work in educational settings,
facilitates the analysis of video clips and audio text. The software allows for the
(a) transcription, (b) identification of analytically interesting video clips, (c) assignment
of key words for coding, (d) creation of complex collections of interrelated video clips,
and (e) exploration of relationship between applied keywords (Transana, 2005). In
comparison, this is beyond traditional qualitative software, such as N*Vivo 7 or
Ethnograph v5.0, which focuses on audio transcription for analysis (Bazeley & Richards,
2005; Lewins & Silver, 2006; Richards, 1999; Seidel, 1998).
N*Vivo is qualitative software with interactive, automatic coding for audio and
video materials, images, and rich text (Richards, 1999). The software supports
quantitative options in exporting files for spreadsheet manipulation in statistical software
(Gibbs, 2004). In addition, the software can create and transfer knowledge networks
between projects for future research, and it carries minimal financial costs in the student
version, when compared to the other available qualitative software packages. Because of

73
the flexibility of analysis for audio- and videotaped interviews and the economical
costs, N*Vivo was used if there were sufficient data to merit the need for the qualitative
software during the analysis. Minitab®, a statistical software application, was used for
quantitative analysis (Brook, 2006; Henderson, 2006; Levine, 2006).
Reliability and Validity
To test reliability, 5 health care team members who did not participate in the
study completed the AIM Inventory twice (Day 1 and Day 30, test-retest). The mean
intuition score of the health care team members who completed the inventory on Day 1
(M = 5.50) was lower than the mean score when the same individuals repeated the
inventory on Day 30 (M = 7.33). The p value of .444 was higher than the α = 0.05.
Therefore, there was no difference in the mean intuition scores based on the sample of
health care team members who completed the AIM Inventory on Day 1 and again on Day
30.
To test validity, the same 5 health care team members completed the MBPI. The
mean intuition score of the 5 health care team members who completed the AIM
Inventory on Day 1 (M = 6.60) was lower than the mean score of the same team members
who completed the MBPI (M = 7.60). The p value of .433 was higher than the α = 0.05.
There was no statically significant difference in the mean intuition scores based on the
sample of health care team members who completed the AIM inventory on Day 1 and the
MBPI.
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The researcher and another health care team member who did not participate in
the study independently scored 29 randomly selected comments taken from the AIM
Inventory against the constructs of intuition. Each appraiser was instructed to select as
many constructs that fit the comment as appropriate. Of the 297 items that were
compared, 284 matched at 95.62% agreement (95% CI: 92.63-97.65). Appraiser 1 agreed
95.95% with the constructs selected per comment. Appraiser 2 agreed 99.66%. The
constructs of intuition appeared to be reliable and repeatable.
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
The HIPAA was relevant to this study because of the nature of the data collected,
namely, stories and experiences relayed by health care team members. The HIPAA,
enacted by Congress in 1996, ensures that medical records, billing, and patient accounts
meet consistent standards with regard to documentation, handling, and privacy. The
Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, or Privacy Rule,
established for patients “national standards to address the use and disclosure of
individuals’ health information for the protection of all patients” (U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services [DHHS], 2003, p. 3). Of significance to this study were the
standards specified in the HIPAA Administrative Simplification Regulation Text,
§164.514. Requirements relating to protecting the use and disclosure of health
information include that “health information does not identify an individual and a person
with appropriate knowledge of and experience with generally accepted statistical,
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scientific principles, and methods for rendering information not identifiable” (DHHS,
2006, p. 66).
The researcher first sorted and then abstracted the narrative documentation from
the voluntarily submitted UORs and then subsequently transcribed the data from the
audiotapes in preparation for coding and analysis. All data were stored securely on the
researcher’s password-protected computer. Any personal identifiers, as indicated in Table
2, were removed from the text and videotape prior to analysis.
Table 2
HIPAA Elements of Privacy Requirements
The following identifiers of the individual or of relatives, employers, or household members of the
individual household, are removed:
Names
Geographic subdivisions smaller than a state including street address, city, county, precinct, zip code, and
the equivalent geocodes;
All elements of dates directly related to an individual, including birth date, admission date, discharge date,
date of death;
Telephone or Fax numbers;
Electronic mail addresses;
Social Security numbers;
Medical record number;
Health plan beneficiary numbers;
Account numbers;
Certificate/license numbers;
Vehicle identifiers, serial numbers, or license plate number;
Device identifiers;
Web Universal Resource Locators (URLs);
Internet Protocol (IP) address numbers;
Biometric identifiers, including finger and voice prints; or
Full face photographic images or any comparable images.
Note. From “HIPAA Administrative Simplification: Regulation Text,” by U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, 2006. Retrieved from http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/Admin SimpRegText.pdf

Informed Consent
For the interviews, each participant was asked to sign an informed consent
dealing with disclosure and authorization. The disclosure section described the purpose of
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the study, the individual conducting the study, the nature of participation, time
commitment, benefits versus risks, confidentiality of the data, level of anonymity
possible, and the researcher’s contact information if the participant had additional
questions or concerns. The agreement acknowledged that the participant understood the
information and requirements, willingly participated, provided explicit instruction for use
of audio and/or videotaped portions of the interview, and granted permission for data
generated and dispersed through usual professional means as a part of the study
(Pennsylvania State University, 2007; see Appendix I). All participants received a onepage handout that explained what constitutes patient identifiers related to HIPAA
regulations (see Appendix J). The participants were asked to refrain from using specific
patient identifiers during the interview process.
The informed consent gave the researcher the opportunity to offer the participants
the option of audio or videotaping the interview session. The participants were given the
opportunity to self-select whether to be video- and audio taped or audio taped only.
Those participants who self-selected to be audio taped received unique identifiers for the
purpose of analysis. They were not identified by name or profession. Data from the audio
were transcribed and analyzed. Name, profession, and number of years as a licensed
health care team member for teaching purposes identified each participant who chose to
be audio- and videotaped. The researcher maintained the video and audiotapes securely
for a period of no more than 12 months from the date of the interviews. At that time, the

77
tapes were destroyed. The researcher removed all identifiers that may have been
mentioned inadvertently during any of the interviews.
Summary
The researcher examined the role of intuition in preventing medical errors from
reaching hospitalized patients by comparing two groups of health care team members’
documented narratives from UORs and responses to the AIM Inventory (Agor, 1984). A
total of 1,836 UORs were analyzed, and 710 signed UORs qualified for participation in
the study. Of those 710 UORs, 382 (54%) were AEs, and 328 (46%) were NMs. The
analysis examined whether there were statistical differences in intuitive content
documented for NMs and the mean scores of intuition for the two comparative groups. In
chapter 4, the data are analyzed to compare the ages, gender, and discipline of the
participants to see if there was a statistically significant difference in the two groups by
type of error.
The participants were interviewed and asked to describe times when they
prevented medical errors from reaching hospitalized patients. The transcribed results
were coded and compared against Welling’s (2005) five phases of intuition. A digital
video disk containing stories abstracted from the interviews regarding error prevention
was created as an educational tool for senior leaders and managers to aid in changing the
culture of safety within health care facilities.
The results may show that there is no evidence that intuition plays a role in
preventing medical errors from reaching hospitalized patients. If so, the findings will add
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new knowledge to existing information on NMs. However, a positive correlation
between high intuitive scores for health care team members and the reporting of NMs
will provide new insights and knowledge into preventing medical errors. This small,
disruptive innovation could change how educators, managers, and leaders look at patient
safety.

CHAPTER 4: RESULTS
Introduction
The researcher examined the role of intuition in preventing medical errors from
reaching hospitalized patients in this quantitative and qualitative study. The purpose was
to explore the documenting of UORs, combined with measuring the intuition scores of
health care team members, in order to gain insight into how medical errors are prevented.
Included in this chapter is a description of the source data, unusual occurrence reports,
constructs of intuition and AIM inventory; a description of the participants, along with
the results of the quantitative and qualitative analyses. The results of the hypothesis
testing is organized by research question and then subdivided into issues pertaining to
each question.
The study involved three parts. The first part quantified the number and type of
voluntarily submitted medication-related UORs from three hospitals on the West Coast.
Medication errors were selected because of the national attention focused on medication
safety for hospitalized patients and stratified into two groups: AE and NM (Cohen, 1999).
Comments documented on UORs in each group were analyzed to quantify the number of
constructs of intuition used to document each event. The two groups were compared to
discern any trend or pattern. A t test was used to compare the results of the mean number
of constructs of intuition for the AEs and the NMs.
The second part of the study compared the mean intuition scores of health care
team members stratified in the two groups who took the AIM Inventory. The participants

80
in the two groups were analyzed by age, gender, discipline, years licensed, and years
worked (Agor, 1984). A t test was used to compare the means scores of intuition for the
two groups. In addition, subsets of the groups were examined: (a) high-intuitive health
care team members who reported NMs, (b) high-intuitive health care team members who
reported AEs, (c) health care team members who were not high-intuitives reporting NMs,
and (d) health care team members who were not high-intuitives reporting AEs. Highintuitive health care team members’ responses from the AIM Inventory were examined
for predictors of intuition against age, years licensed, years of experience, discipline, and
gender.
Finally, the researcher conducted interviews with the health care team members,
asking them to describe a time when they had prevented medical errors from reaching
hospitalized patients. The social impact of decreasing or eliminating medical errors may
be significant in terms of cost and human life. The purpose of this study was to identify
triggers or ideas that may have contributed to stopping medical errors. The researcher
coded the transcribed interviews against Welling’s (2005) five phases of intuitive
knowledge: detection, dichotomic awareness, related objects, metaphorical solution, and
explicit verbal understanding. The findings from the quantitative and qualitative analysis
were integrated to identify the role of intuition in preventing medical errors from
reaching hospitalized patients. This exploratory work made an initial examination of the
documentation by health care team members on UORs, describing both AEs and NMs,
comparing mean intuition scores, and analyzing interviews describing NMs.
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Source of the Data
The three hospitals participating in this study received 1,836 voluntarily
submitted, medication-related UORs between July 1, 2007, and December 31, 2007. The
UORs were stratified into two groups: (a) an AE, when a medical error reached a
hospitalized patient or (b) an NM, when a medical error did not reach a hospitalized
patient. Of the 1,836 UORs submitted, 1,103 had a health care team member’s name and
department or nursing unit attached. The two groups were compared, and duplicate
names were eliminated. This left 710 UORs signed by health care team members that
qualified for participation in the study. Of those 710 UORs, 382 (54%) were AEs, and
328 (46%) were NMs.
A request to participate, the AIM Inventory, and a demographic questionnaire
were mailed to 710 health care team members at the three hospitals. A follow-up
electronic reminder was sent. The return rate was 201 (28%). Of those inventories
returned from health care team members who completed a UOR, 112 (56%) were from
AEs and 91 (44%) were related to an NM. This was similar to the proportion of
inventories mailed out.
The returned AIM Inventory and demographic data were given identification
numbers; the data were entered into a secure database by the researcher, who also
ensured that the documents were organized; and the returned paper copies were stored
securely. Ten returned inventories did not contain any demographic information. The
comments from UORs, inventories, and interviews were compiled, spell checked, and
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analyzed using qualitative software. Notes of comments, trends, and further research
questions were logged into a research journal kept by the researcher.
An electronic request was sent to health care team members to be interviewed
about times when they prevented medical errors from reaching hospitalized patients.
Eight individuals volunteered to participate. Each interview took between 20 and 30
minutes. Arrangements were made so that the interviews would not interfere with the
participants’ regular work activities. The tapes were transcribed by the researcher.
Content was qualitatively analyzed using Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS)
Text Analysis for Surveys 2.1™, which became available to the researcher at no
additional cost during the data collection phase.
Unusual Occurrence Reports
The distribution of the voluntarily submitted medication-related UORs included
767 (42%) UORs on day shift (7 a.m.-3 p.m.), 676 (37%) on evening shift (3 p.m.-11
p.m.), and 393 (21%) on night shift (11 p.m.-7 a.m.; see Table 3). Eighty-three percent
were completed by nursing health care team members, and the remaining 17% were
completed by ancillary health care team members, such as laboratory or diagnostic
imagining technicians as well as those in nutritional services. The UORs were stratified
as AEs and NMs (see Table 4). The narrative comments were analyzed separately for
constructs of intuition.
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Table 3
Distribution of Medication-Related UORs by Hospital and Shift
Hospital A
Hospital B
Hospital C
Total

Days
77 (52.3%)
305 (39.0%)
385 (42.4%)
767 (41.7%)

Evenings
38 (25.8%)
300 (38.3%)
338 (37.2%)
676 (36.8%)

Nights
32 (21.7%)
177 (22.6%)
184 (20.2%)
393 (21.4%)

Total
147 (8.0%)
782 (42.5%)
907 (49.4%)
1,836 (100%)

Table 4
Distribution of Medication-Related UORs by Hospital and Type of Error
Hospital A
Hospital B
Hospital C
Total

Total UORs
147
782
907
1,836

% of UORs
8%
43%
49%
100%

NMs
64
268
451
783

% of NMs
8%
34%
58%
100%

AEs
83
514
456
1053

% of AEs
8%
49%
43%
100%

The 1,836 medication-related UORs fell into 16 categories. The top three
categories were Other (480 or 26%), Omission (393 or 21%), and Wrong Dose (190 or
10%; see Figure 1). These three categories were consistent with previous analysis by the
hospital system. A national comparison was not found primarily because of the lack of
consistency in definition among the facilities regarding what constitutes a medical error.
Further analysis that contributes to understanding the causes of the high percentages may
be beneficial.
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Pare to Chart: Type of M e dication Error (July-De ce mbe r 2007)
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Figure 1. Pareto chart by type of medication error.
Constructs of Intuition
Each of the 1,836 medication-related UORs had comments. The researcher
quantified the total number of narrative-documented items related to intuition from the
selected medication-related UORs. Each construct was assigned a value of 1, and each
UOR was assigned a numeric value of zero to 10 to obtain the total number of intuitionrelated constructs. The AE UORs averaged 4.08 documented constructs per reported
event; NM UORs averaged 3.90 documented constructs per reported event (see Table 5).
Table 5
Distribution of Constructs of Intuition by Type of Error
Sample size

M

SD

Range

AE

1052

4.07

1.449

6 (1-7)

NM

784

3.90

1.840

7 (1-8)
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AIM Inventory
The results of the AIM Inventory (Agor, 1984) produced an intuitive score for
each participant. Zero was a low intuitive score, and 12 was a high intuitive score. For the
purposes of comparison, the results were reported by category: (a) low intuitive scores (04), (b) medium intuitive scores (5-8), and high intuitive scores (9-12; Agor). The mean
intuition score of all participants was 5.652 (SD = 1.794), with a median score of 5.0. The
mean intuition score for the near-miss group were higher than the AE group, with the
males being slightly higher than the females (see Table 6).
Table 6
Distribution of Mean Intuition Scores
Sample
size

M

SD

Mode

Median

Range

Overall

201

5.652

1.794

5

5.0

9(1-10)

AE*

112

5.500

1.750

5

5.0

9(1-10)

NM*

89

5.843

1.840

5

5.0

8(2-10)

High Intuitive
Scores*

14

9.214

0.426

9

9.0

1(9-10)

Medium Intuitive
Scores*

134

6.134

1.060

5

6.0

3(5-8)

Low Intuitive
Scores*

53

3.491

0.823

4

4.0

3(1-4)

Female**

170

5.641

1.766

5

5.5

8(2-10)

Male**

21

5.810

2.182

5

5.0

9(1-10)

Nursing**

167

5.575

1.775

5

5.0

9(1-10)

Pharmacy**

13

7.231

1.691

6

8.0

9(1-10)

All Others**

11

5.091

1.700

5

5.0

9(1-10)

*n = 201
**n = 191
10 participants did not complete demographic information
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Description of the Participants
Of the 710 inventories that were mailed, 201 (28%) participants responded, which
included responses from 170 females (84%); 21 males (11%); and 10 (5%) who
completed the inventory, but did not complete the demographic information. The average
age of the participants who completed the demographic information was 43 (22-70
years). The health care team members had been licensed on average 17 years (0-48 years)
and had worked for the health care system for 12 years (1-36 years; see Table 7).
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Table 7
Demographic Distribution of Participants
Demographic
category
Age
Gender

Overall
(201)
43 years
(22-70 years)
Females = 170
Males = 21
No response = 10

AE
(110 or 56%)
41 years
(22-63 years)
Females = 91
Males = 13
No response = 8

NM
(91 or 44%)
44 years
(23-70 years)
Females =79
Males = 8
No response = 2

Discipline

Diagnostic imaging = 2
ED technician = 1
Laboratory = 2
No response = 10
Nursing = 167
Nutritional services = 2
Pharmacy = 13
Physician = 3
Physician assistant = 1

Diagnostic Imaging = 2
ED Technician = 1
No response = 8
Nursing = 92
Nutritional services = 1
Pharmacy = 5
Physician = 2
Physician assistant = 1

Laboratory = 2
No response = 2
Nursing = 75
Nutritional services = 1
Pharmacy = 8
Physician = 1

Educational
preparation

Diploma = 14
Associate degree = 36
BS = 25
BSN = 88
MS = 5
MSN = 4
Nurse practitioner = 2
Physician = 3
Doctorate = 5
No response = 15

Diploma = 6
Associate degree = 24
BS = 11
BSN = 47
MS = 3
MSN = 3
Nurse practitioner = 1
Physician = 2
Doctorate = 1
No response = 13

Diploma = 8
Associate degree = 12
BS = 14
BSN = 41
MS = 2
MSN = 1
Nurse practitioner = 1
Physician = 1
Doctorate = 4
No response = 2

Number of
years licensed

17 years (0-48 years)

15 years (0-42 years)

19 years (1-48 years)

Number of
years employed
at health care
facility

11 years (1-36 years)

10 years (1-36 years)

13 years (1-34 years)

The second set of participants comprised 8 health care team members who were
interviewed. Those individuals included 5 males (63%) and 3 females (37%). The
average age of the participants was 53 (46-63 years), 10 years older on average than the
participants who completed only the AIM Inventory. Health care team members were
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licensed on average 27 years (18-35 years) and had worked for the health care system
for 22 years (7-28 years; see Table 8).
Table 8
Demographic Distribution of Interviewed Participants
Demographic category
Age
Gender
Discipline
Educational preparation
Number of years licensed
Number of years employed at the
health care facility

Overall
(8)
53 years (46-63 years)
Females = 3 and males = 5
Nursing = 2, pharmacy = 1, physician = 4, and social worker = 1
BS = 1, BSN = 1, MS = 1, MSW = 1, and physician = 4
27 years (18-35 years)
22 years (7-28 years)

Quantitative Analyses Results
To describe the results of a sample statistically, four fundamental factors were
considered: (a) central tendency, (b) shape, (c) variation, and (d) normality. Each factor
assimilates the raw data and assists in transforming the results into information. Central
tendency is an estimation of the center of a distribution of values. The three major types
are mean, median, and mode. The shape represents the pattern of distribution of the data,
such as symmetrical or skewed (see Figure 2). Measures of variation refer to the range
and standard deviation associated with the data. The normality speaks to the shape, the
central tendency, focusing on the two main characteristics of the mean and standard
deviation (Brook, 2006; Levine, 2006). The data appeared to be normally distributed;
therefore, t tests and chi-square were run for analysis.
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Summary for Intuition Score
Anderson-Darling Normality Test
A-Squared
P-Value <
Mean
StDev
Variance
Skewness
Kurtosis
N

2

4

6

8

10

Minimum
1st Quartile
Median
3rd Quartile
Maximum

3.16
0.005
5.6517
1.7939
3.2181
0.130285
-0.235551
201
1.0000
4.0000
5.0000
7.0000
10.0000

95% Confidence Interval for Mean
5.4022

5.9013

95% Confidence Interval for Median
5.0000

6.0000

95% Confidence Interval for StDev

95% Confidence Intervals

1.6340

1.9888

Mean
Median
5.0

5.2

5.4

5.6

5.8

6.0

Figure 2. Histogram of intuition scores.
As mentioned in chapter 1, three research questions were posed to facilitate the
understanding of the role of intuition for health care team members in preventing medical
errors from reaching hospitalized patients. Five hypotheses were tested based on the
results of the data analyzed from AIM Inventory in an effort to understand the differences
among the health care team members in preventing medical errors from reaching patients.
Each hypothesis is presented with a summary of the findings.
Those hypotheses included comparisons of (a) intuitive scores grouped by AEs
and NMs; (b) intuitive scores grouped by gender of the participants; (c) number of
documented constructs of intuition for AEs and NMs; (d) low, medium, and high
intuitive scores by age of participant; and (e) low, medium, and high intuitive scores by
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gender. A comparison of the participants’ ages explored the possibility that the older,
more experienced health care team member would be more intuitive. An examination of
gender led to the perception that the females in the study were more intuitive than the
males. Further exploration led to analyzing the results of gender by discipline. Following
is an iteration of each research question, along with the issues and hypotheses raised
based on the analysis of the data gleaned from the AIM Inventory.
Research Question 1: What role does the intuition of health care team members at
this integrated West Coast health care system play in preventing medical errors from
reaching hospitalized patients?
Hypothesis 1
Issue 1: Is there a difference between the mean intuitive scores of health care
team members who submit an AE versus an NM?
H01: There is no difference in the mean intuitive scores of health care team
members who submitted medication-related UORs.
Issue 1 was answered by comparing the mean intuition scores of health care team
members who submitted AEs versus NMs. Based on the results of a two-sample t test
using a significance level of .05, the researcher failed to reject the null hypothesis,
t(-1.34), p = .181 (two-tailed), df = 184. There was no difference between the mean
intuition scores of the two groups when examined by type of medical error. Intuitive
scores of health care team members would not clarify the role of intuition in preventing
errors.
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Hypothesis 2
Issue 2: Is there a difference between the mean intuitive scores by gender of
health care team members who submitted an AE versus an NM?
H02: There is no difference in the mean intuitive scores by gender of health care
team members who submitted medication-related UORs.
Issue 2 was answered by comparing the mean intuition scores by gender of health
care team members who submitted UORs. Based on the results of a two-sample t test
using a significance level of .05, the researcher failed to reject the null hypothesis,
t(-0.34), p = .736, df = 23. There was a modest difference between the mean intuitive
scores of the two groups by gender (see Figure 3). However, the results did not
substantiate a statically significant difference of intuition score by gender and did not
clarify the role of intuition in comparing females to males.
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Boxplot of Intuition Score vs Gender
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Figure 3. Boxplot of intuition scores by gender.
One difference was noted in stratifying the participants by gender within
disciplines. The level of intuition score did differ by disciplines between the groups,
F(7, 51.09) = 7.30 p < .05, and within the groups, F (183, 571.79) = 3.12, p < .05 (see
Table 9). When stratified by type of error, there was no statistical difference by discipline
for AEs (see Tables 10 & 11). Of importance was the statistically significant difference
by discipline for NMs (see Tables 12 & 13). This difference noted between AE and NM
leads to additional questioning regarding gender and the use of intuition in preventing
medical errors.
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Table 9
ANOVA by Intuition Score by Discipline
Source
Between groups
Within groups
Total

df
7
183
190

Sum of squares
51.09
571.79
622.88

Mean squares
7.30
3.12

F
2.34

p
.026

Table 10
ANOVA by AE Intuition Score by Discipline
Source
Between groups
Within groups
Total

df

Sum of squares

Mean squares

F

p

6
97
103

18.08
301.91
319.99

3.01
3.11

0.97

.451

SD
1.79
1.00
2.83
1.00
3.00
1.00
3.00
1.79
2.83
1.79
1.79
2.83

t value
1.69

p value
.166

df
4

0.78

.578

1

-0.44

.736

1

-1.01

.495

1

0.09

.941

1

1.00

.500

1

Table 11
t Test by AE Intuition Score by Discipline
Type of error
AE

Sample
Pharmacy
Nursing
Diagnostic imaging
Nursing
Physician
Nursing
Physician
Pharmacy
Diagnostic imaging
Pharmacy
Pharmacy
Diagnostic imaging

Sample size
5
92
2
92
2
92
2
5
2
5
5
2

M
6.80
5.44
7.00
5.44
4.50
5.44
4.50
6.80
7.00
6.80
6.80
7.00

Table 12
ANOVA by NM Intuition Score by Discipline
Source

df

Sum of squares

Mean squares

F

p

Between groups
Within groups
Total

4
82
86

34.16
262.19
296.34

8.54
3.20

2.67

.038
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Table 13
t Test by NM Intuition Score by Discipline
Type of error
NM

Sample
Pharmacy
Nursing
Diagnostic imaging
Nursing
Pharmacy
Diagnostic imaging

Sample size
8
75
2
75
8
2

M
7.50
5.74
6.00
5.74
7.50
6.00

SD
1.69
1.81
0.001
1.81
1.69
0.001

t value
2.77

p value
.024

df
8

1.21

.230

74

23.51

.040

7

Additional analysis looked at stratifying by gender within the discipline. There
was no difference for nursing, t(-0.38), p = .712, df = 15. However, there was a
statistically significant difference within pharmacy by gender, t(3.94), p = .006, df = 7
(see Figure 4). In addition, there was a statistically significant difference between females
when comparing nurses to pharmacists, t(-8.77), p = .00, df = 8. There was no statistically
significant difference between males when comparing nurses to pharmacists, t(-0.04),
p = .969, df = 16. The other disciplines had only females and fewer than 3 participants in
each discipline, so a comparison was not possible. The difference in mean intuition
scores by discipline posed the following questions: Would teams of health care members
have a better sense of intuition that would prevent a medical error from reaching a
hospitalized patient? Would the collective intuition of various health care team members
who are part of an operating room team have a better sense in order to prevent a medical
error than as individuals? Would developing team versus individual intuition provide a
stronger base to prevent medical errors? These results are discussed in more detail in
chapter 5.
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Boxplot of Intuition Score for Pharmacists by Ge nde r
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Figure 4. Boxplot of intuition scores for pharmacists by gender.
Research Question 2: Do health care team member’s document constructs of
intuition when identifying NMs as compared to AEs on UORs?
Hypothesis 3
Issue 3: Is there a difference between the numbers of documented constructs of
intuition for AEs versus NMs?
H03: There is no difference in the number of documented constructs of intuition
for AEs versus NMs.
Issue 3 was answered by comparing the mean number of documented constructs
of intuition for voluntarily reported AEs and NMs. Based on the results of a two-sample t
test using a significance level of .05, the null hypothesis was rejected, t( 2.20), p = .028,
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df = 1444. Therefore, there was a difference between the mean intuition scores of the
two groups.
Research Question 3: Are there differences about health care team members at the
integrated West Coast health care system who rate higher on the AIM Inventory in
preventing medical errors from reaching hospitalized patients?
Hypothesis 4
Issue 4: Is there a difference in the low, medium, and high intuitive scores by age
of health care team members who submitted UORs regarding medication-related errors?
H04: Not all the population means are equal in the low, medium, and high intuitive
scores when comparing the age of health care team members who submitted UORs
regarding medication errors.
Issue 4 was answered by conducting a one-way ANOVA to determine whether
significant differences existed when comparing the differences among and within
population means, in this case, comparing the intuition scores by age of health care team
members who submitted UORs regarding medication errors. Based on the results of the
ANOVA using a significance level of .05, the researcher failed to reject the null
hypothesis. The level of intuition score did not differ by age between the groups, F (5,
19.30) = 3.86 p < .05, and within the groups, F (195, 624.32) = 3.20, p < .05 (see Table
14).
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Table 14
ANOVA by Intuition Score and Age
Source
Between groups
Within groups
Total

df
5
195
200

Sum of squares
19.30
624.32
643.62

Mean squares
3.86
3.20

F
1.21

p
.308

Hypothesis 5
Issue 5: Is there a difference in the low, medium, and high intuitive scores by
gender of health care team members who submitted UORs regarding medication errors?
H05: There is no difference in the low, medium, and high intuitive scores by
gender of health care team members who submitted UORs regarding medication errors.
Issue 5 was answered by comparing the intuition scores of health care team
members who submitted UORs regarding medication errors (see Table 15). Based on the
results of chi-square using a significance level of .05, the researcher failed to reject the
null hypothesis. The level of intuition score (low, medium, and high) did not differ by
gender, χ2 (2, N = 190) = 0.860, p > .05. There is no difference among the mean intuition
scores (low, medium, and high) by gender.
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Table 15
Chi-Square of Gender and Intuition Score
Gender
Female

Low intuitive score (0-4) Medium intuitive score (5-8)
112
47
113.04
45.39
0.009
0.056
15
Male
4
13.96
5.61
0.076
0.460
Total
51
127
Chi-Sq = 0.8609
df = 2
p value = .650 (1 cell with expected counts < 5)

High intuitive score (9-12)
11
11.57
0.028
2
1.43
0.227
13

Total
170
21
191

Qualitative Analysis
Three different segments of the study were analyzed for narrative content:
(a) comments from voluntarily submitted medication-related UORs, (b) narrative
comments from the AIM Inventory, and (c) interviews with the participants describing
times when medical errors were prevented from reaching hospitalized patients. The
narrative comments were analyzed by the researcher using SPSS Text Analysis for
Surveys 2.1™ (2006). Text analysis, a form of qualitative analysis, is the extraction of
useful information from text (such as open-ended responses) so that the key ideas
contained within this text can be grouped into an appropriate number of categories
(SPSS).
Once the text was coded and reviewed for face validity (i.e., did the groupings
and number of responses seem appropriate versus disproportional), the next step was to
use the visualization tool (Category Web) option in the software. This tool allowed the
researcher to analyze the categorization results further. The primary function was to
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review the category definitions to “uncover categories that were too similar, i.e. share
more than 75% of the responses” (SPSS, 2006, p. 101). If the subcategories overlapped
greater than 75%, then the categories and definitions needed to be reevaluated by
collapsing the overlapping subcategories or refining the existing definitions. This process
was used with each of the three data sets.
Separately, the narrative comments from the NM UORs, the AIM Inventory, and
the interviews did not have overlapping subcategories. However, there were overlapping
subcategories in the AE UOR narratives. The subcategories were all above the threshold
of 75%, ranging from 80.3% to 97.8%, which suggested that there was not as much
distinction by the health care team members in documenting an AE when a medical error
reached a patient. With the regrouping of the subcategories, the four most frequently
coded categories overall were hunches, something is wrong, pattern recognition, and gut
feeling. This supported Benner’s (1984) novice-to-expert model and Gladwell’s (2005)
thin slicing or pattern recognition.
Examples
The examples documented for the category of Hunches involved clinical
situations where medications that should have been administered were not and the hunch
or guess of the causative factors proved correct. “I checked the outstanding overdue
medication list and found two meds overdue…the previous nurse was unaware these
meds had been ordered…I checked the order sheet and then called Pharmacy” (UOR
narrative 401). A second example was “I could not tell you what was wrong, I had a
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hunch that my patient was going to code and he did later that night” (UOR narrative,
212).
The second highest category, Something Is Wrong, had multiple examples: “a
quiet voice in my mind; a red flag ‘something is not right” with an accompanying
increase in (my) alertness and attention” (AIM Participant 12). A second example was the
following:
The patient did not “look right,” but vital signs were stable; (I) told the surgery
team they needed to evaluate and look into this further. After persistent
discussion, they agreed to see the patient, who quickly decompensated and was
rushed to surgery. If I had waited until the vital signs changed, the patient would
have been in real trouble. (AIM Participant 97)
Examples of pattern recognition were described as past experiences or, in more
detail: “intuitive abilities are based on lots of experience; ability to define patterns, shared
observations of details, and quickly analyze the data” (AIM Participant 37). Another
participant noted that intuition was “extrapolating from past experience to current
problems” (AIM Participant 82). A third example described intuition as, “To be clear, I
rarely reply on intuition alone. Intuition is nothing mystical, it is high efficiency
processing that relies on all of the salient features, pattern recognition and, embedded
repeated experiences, as in Patricia Benner’s novice-to-expert” (AIM Participant 99).
Examples of comments coded for the category of gut feeling included, “One time
with a patient, all the numbers were good but my observations and ‘gut feeling’ said
otherwise. I called the physician and the patient ended up in ICU” (AIM Participant 21).
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A different participant described intuition as, “I can look and my ‘gut’ does the
decision making” (AIM Participant 134).
Of interest, an 11th category emerged containing 36 comments related to prayer
and meditation. This was not a construct noted in Agor’s (1984) work or in current
literature related to intuition. The health care facilities selected for inclusion in this study
did have a religious affiliation. This in part may have explained the prayer-related
comments. Further study would be needed to understand the significance of prayer and
the relationship to intuition including comparing religious and secular health care
facilities.
Interviews
Eight health care team members were interviewed about a time when they
prevented a medical error from reaching a patient. The interviews were transcribed,
coded, and analyzed against Welling’s (2005) five phases of intuitive knowledge. Two of
the 8 interviews substantiated the phases. In hindsight, the limited interviews were not
sufficient to gain adequate information during the interview process.
The researcher’s bias was that this would be a straightforward process for the
participants. Instead, what was observed was that participants’ hesitation and seeming
uncertainty how to articulate an example of stopping a medical error from reaching a
patient. The interview process was altered to ask the participants not only to describe or
define a medical error but also to define intuition. One nurse described intuition as
knowledge:
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Then a lot of it is just the knowledge – if you have (a patient with) a GI bleed,
you know that they can bleed at any minute. So that you are always on alert for
that, you are always on alert for signs and symptoms of that or with a renal
patient, their K (potassium) may go up. You are always on alert for things like
that, and it becomes a part of your practice. It is part of what I do. (Interview 1)
Another participant talked about the art and science of medicine and described intuition
as “a gut sense…not necessarily grounded in science. There is a nagging sense that
something just doesn’t fit, and it’s the intuition that makes you question the science”
(Interview 8).
The transcriptions of the interviews were analyzed using SPSS Text Analysis for
Surveys 2.1™ (2006). The content was coded against Welling’s (2005) five phases of
intuition, a process consisting of sequenced phases with increasing amounts of
information: detection, dichotomic awareness, related object, metaphorical solution, and
explicit verbal understanding. Each phase involves different types of knowledge. Of the
content review, only 2 of the 8 health care team members’ content depicted all five
phases.
First, a cardiovascular nurse described an incorrect surgical consent that was
detected and surgery postponed until the correct consent was obtained. This nurse, with
33 years of experience, described three of Welling’s (2005) five phases, that is, detection,
dichotomic awareness, and related object, in her ability to ascertain and ask questions
quickly when something was not right.
I believe it has served me well through the years just to have the ability to know
that I am empowered to ask more questions, to pursue avenues that I might be
uncomfortable with, and certainly, I think that serves the nurse well when you
have limited time with a patient, especially in the interview process. The sedate
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patient is only in the pre-op holding area 30 minutes, and (the nurse) has to
drill down to the problem rapidly because everybody is depending upon
everything to align and be accurate; otherwise, it stops the surgery. (Interview 1)
The nurse further articulated the solution and explicit verbal understanding:
I think it is, ah, professional body of knowledge that you graduate [with]. You
[have] a license that says, “Yes I have this amount of knowledge to operate…” on
top of that; I believe that it (intuition) is a gift that you cannot teach somebody.
Your past; your experience with your family; your culture of growing up; what is
OK; the permission inside to say, “I am not comfortable, and I need to check this
out.” I think the healing arts need to give permission to its providers so that we
take the time in our system of business, and certainly, there is more and more to
do to and accomplish and to compile with. A person could feel overwhelmed and
that to do the right thing to prevail, to take the time out to take the necessary
precautions to follow up on the intuitive “I don’t feel comfortable here” or this
doesn’t align or what was this about to feel free to communicate that and then to
act on it. And thirdly, to not feel like there is some reprisal or price to pay.
(Interview 1)
The nurse articulated the five phases in this example.
A second example came from a perinatologist with 29 years of experience who
talked about a time regarding pattern recognition of a baby with a tentative diagnosis of
necrotizing enterocolitis:
I think you have to experiences (to have intuition). It is one of the challenges of
health care is that you have to have enough experience to become proficient, and
book learning is not enough. So, you have to be able to combine your experience,
and that’s what makes health care risky for our patients. It is hard to just
reproduce all the possible experiences that you are going to see over your career.
There are still things that I have never seen, and so the question always is so what
would help me in those situations recognize that this is different than anything I
have ever seen and that is where you talk with your colleagues. (Interview 4)
Summary
The overall purpose of this exploratory study was to examine the role of intuition
in preventing medical errors from reaching hospitalized patients. Tacit knowledge or
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intuition is one aspect of knowledge management (Davenport & Prusak, 2000;
Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). The ability to articulate tacit knowledge, often otherwise
unattainable to other team members, into explicit concepts that could potentially prevent
a medical error is fundamental to changing the culture of safety within the health care
system. The analysis of error reporting, measurement of intuition scores, and interviews
with health care team members provided insight into the role of intuition and knowledge
of medical error prevention. Voluntarily reported medication-related UORs were
analyzed for intuitive content. Narrative documentation was coded, quantified, and
compared for constructs of intuition. Seven hundred and ten health care team members
who signed the analyzed UORs were sent an AIM Inventory designed to establish their
intuitiveness scores. There was a 28% (201) response rate. Five hypotheses were
analyzed using t test, chi-square, and ANOVA. Interviews were conducted with 8
members of the health care team who talked about times when they had prevented
medical errors from reaching hospitalized patients. Their remarks were transcribed,
coded, and compared to Welling’s (2005) stages of intuition.
There were no statically significant differences when comparing mean intuition
scores by type of error; gender; or levels of intuition score (low, medium, or high) by age
or gender of participants. There was a difference when comparing the mean number of
documented constructs of intuition for AEs and NMs. When the results were stratified by
type of error and discipline, there was a difference for NM, pharmacy and nursing, and
pharmacy and diagnostic imaging. High-intuitive health care team members’ responses
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from the AIM Inventory were examined for predictors of intuition and phases of
intuition trended in the audio- and videotaped interviews against age, years of experience,
discipline, and gender. No differences were found.
Interviews were conducted with health care team members asking them to
describe times when they prevented medical errors from reaching hospitalized patients.
The purpose was to identify triggers or ideas that may have contributed to stopping the
medical errors. The transcribed interviews were coded against Welling’s (2005) five
phases of intuitive knowledge: detection, dichotomic awareness, related objects,
metaphorical solution, and explicit verbal understanding. Two of the 8 participants met
Welling’s five phases of intuition.
The qualitative analysis of documented comments from the UORs, the narrative
from the AIM Inventory, and the interviews showed that intuition is something that the
practitioners in this study used and perhaps even underused in daily practice. The most
common descriptor noted was a “gut feeling,” or pattern recognition, which supported
Gladwell’s (2005) thin slicing and Benner’s (1984) model of novice to expert. The health
care team members who participated in the interviews did not readily have stories to
describe times when they had prevented medical errors from reaching hospitalized
patients. However, when they were asked to talk about intuition in daily practice, they
noted that other practitioners used intuition. An observation by the researcher was that the
participants found it easier to identify intuition in a colleague than in personal use.
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Further research would be needed in this area to more fully understand how intuition
is used by health care team members.
The findings from the quantitative and qualitative analysis were integrated to
identify the role of intuition in preventing medical errors from reaching hospitalized
patients. This exploratory work took an initial examination of the content documented by
health care workers on UORs describing both AEs and NMs, comparing mean intuition
scores, and analyzing the interviews of health care team members describing NMs.
Chapter 5 is a summary and interpretation of the findings, and offers
recommendations for action and future research. Five hypotheses were tested in an effort
to understand the differences among the health care team members in preventing medical
errors from reaching hospitalized patients. No differences were found when comparing
mean intuition scores by type of error and level of intuition score (low, medium, high) by
age or gender of the participants. However, there were differences when comparing the
number of documented constructs of intuition by type of error and stratifying error type
(NM) by discipline, that is, pharmacy to nursing and diagnostic imaging. Of the 8 health
care team members who were interviewed and described times when they had prevented
medical errors from reaching hospitalized patients, 2 articulated Welling’s (2005) five
stages of intuition.

CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Introduction
The researcher, using an exploratory quantitative and qualitative approach,
examined the role of intuition in preventing medical errors from reaching hospitalized
patients. The purpose of the study was to understand the role of intuition in preventing
medical errors from reaching hospitalized patients. Researchers have studied sentinel
events and AEs through retrospective review (Bogner, 1994; DeMott, 1995; Fortune &
Peters, 1995; Helmreich, 1999).
This study was conceived and developed to add insight into how medical errors
are prevented because of the ramifications for society as a whole. As an example, the
resources allocated on identifying, analyzing, and correcting medical errors could be
spent on providing safer health care to more individuals. If health care team members can
identify and prevent medical errors, there may be less need for outside regulatory
agencies to mandate measurement, thus providing one area where health care costs might
be lowered. Rising health care costs affect the individuals who are the most in need,
namely, the vulnerable and the uninsured.
No differences were found when comparing mean intuition scores by type of
error; gender; or levels of intuition score (low, medium, or high) by age or gender of the
participants. There was a difference, however, when comparing the mean number of
documented constructs of intuition for AEs and NMs. When the results were stratified by
type of error and discipline, there was a difference for NM, pharmacy and nursing, and
pharmacy and diagnostic imaging. High-intuitive health care team members’ responses
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from the AIM Inventory (Agor, 1984) were examined for predictors of intuition and
phases of intuition trended in the audio- and videotaped interviews against age, years of
experience, discipline, and gender. No differences were found.
Interpretation of the Findings
Five hypotheses were tested, and data were analyzed from the AIM Inventory
(Agor, 1984) in an effort to understand the differences among the health care team
members in preventing medical errors from reaching hospitalized patients. The
hypotheses included comparisons of (a) intuitive scores grouped by health care team
members who reported AEs and NMs; (b) intuitive scores grouped by gender of the
participants; (c) number of documented constructs of intuition for AEs and NMs;
(d) low, medium, and high intuitive scores by age of participant; and (e) low, medium,
and high intuitive scores by gender. A comparison of the participants’ ages explored the
possibility that the older, more experienced health care team members would be more
intuitive. An examination of gender led to the perception that the females in the study
were more intuitive than the males. None of the factors that were studied demonstrated
any difference between health care team members who voluntarily submitted UORs for
either AEs or NMs. The idea that something would emerge as a predictor, such as gender,
discipline, or years of experience, seemed plausible when reviewing the work of Benner
(1984), Gladwell (2005), Klein (2001), and Welling (2005).
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Issue 1: Comparison of Intuitive Scores
The intuitive scores of health care team members who voluntarily reported AEs
versus NMs were compared as one mechanism to describe the difference between the two
groups. A statistically significant difference between the two groups would have provided
one objective point of reference. In chapter 4, the NM group’s mean score was 5.843, as
compared to the AE group’s mean score of 5.50, reflecting a modest difference. Had the
NM mean score been higher, it would have coincided with Gladwell’s (2005) explanation
of thin slicing, or the unconscious mind finding “patterns in situations and behaviors
based on very narrow slices of experience” (p. 23). Epstein (1999) described this as
knowledge through experience, that is, a “collection of information, intuition, and
interpretations that guide professional practice” (p. 834). One possible explanation of a
higher mean intuitive score for reported NMs would have been that the health care team
member was able to prevent the error by synthesizing didactic knowledge with real-world
experience.
A higher AE mean score could have been explained by Klein (2001) as the
elusive nature of pattern recognition. He concluded that because patterns can be vague or
indistinct, health care team members may have difficulty recognizing them. Only
hindsight enables the health care team member to recognize a pattern after the medical
error has reached the patient. Because there was not a statistically significant difference
between the two groups, one summation would have been that pattern recognition may
not play a role in preventing medical errors.
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Issue 2: Comparison of Intuitive Scores by Gender
The second comparison included examining the mean intuition scores by gender
of health care team members who submitted UORs. The results from chapter 4 showed a
modest difference between the mean score of females (5.64) and males (5.804). The
debate in the literature has suggested that analytical thought is masculine and intuition is
feminine (Dreyfus & Dreyfus; Faugier, 2005). In nursing, a traditionally femalepredominant profession, intuition is an implicit, fundamental part of the process (Benner,
1984; Benner et al., 1992; Tanner, 2006). In other words, it is an accepted part of the
nursing process. Cappon (1993) asserted that males have less tolerance for the notion of
intuition rather than females having a higher intuitive ability.
Based on the results of this small sample size, it appeared that there was no
statistically significant difference between genders. Additional analysis looked at
comparing gender by low, medium, and high intuition scores. The one exception was the
difference found in the subset of pharmacy participants. From the results in chapter 4, the
mean score for female pharmacists (8.429) was statistically higher (p = .006) than for
male pharmacists (5.833). The researcher queried two experienced pharmacy managers
who did not participate in the study to see whether an explanation was self-apparent.
Both were surprised by the findings mainly because the perceived primary function in
pharmacy has to do with facts and data and less with interpretation or feeling. Further
research would be needed in this area.
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Issue 3: Comparison of Number of Constructs of Intuition
The third area of comparison was the difference between the numbers of
documented constructs of intuition for AEs versus NMs. Originally, one thought had
been that an early predictor in understanding an NM would be how the health care team
member documented the event. The thought was that there would be a higher number of
constructions of intuition documented about an NM. The idea seemed plausible that a
health care team member would describe an NM in terms of hunches, namely, that
something was wrong, or pattern recognition. The results in chapter 4 depicted a
statistically significant difference (p = .028) in the number of documented constructs of
intuition. It was noted that 2 of the 10 constructs of intuition, namely, hunches and
something is wrong, both had the highest number of coded responses from the review of
the UOR narrative responses. At some basic level of analysis, this would seem innately
true because the health care team member was documenting an actual or a potential
medical error.
Issue 4: Differences Among Low, Medium, and High Intuition Scores by Age
The next issue examined if a difference existed between health care team
members with low, medium, and high intuition scores by age. The literature suggested
that health care team members with more experience would have more ability in
recognizing a potential problem or a medical error (Benner, 1984; Mezirow &
Associates, 2000; Schön, 1983). One proxy for more experience is examining the age of
the health care team member. For example, a 22-year-old would not have the same
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experiences as a 56-year-old health care practitioner, both in life and work
experiences. Bastick (1982) noted that the “process of intuition is not a linear step-bystep process, but a global nonlinear process using information from global perception” (p.
172).
The ANOVA compared the differences among and within population means
intuition scores by age of the health care team members who submitted UORs regarding
medication errors. No differences between the groups were found. This was somewhat
surprising. Klein (2001) summarized intuition as how an individual transforms
experience into action, stating that “it is a set of hunches, impulses, insights, gut feelings,
anticipation and judgments stemming from previous events in the person’s life” (p. 293).
This would lead to a conjecture that as an individual gains more experience over time, or
as the individual becomes older, intuition would evolve. Bastick (1982) supported this
idea in comparing low-intuitive types to high-intuitive types when he observed that lowintuitive types lacked the confidence to make decisions and demanded more information
before making a decision.
Issue 5: Differences Among Low, Medium, and High Intuition Scores by Gender
The final issue examined if there was a difference in the low, medium, and high
intuitive scores by gender of the health care team members. Based on the results of chisquare, no difference was noted among the mean intuition scores (low, medium, and
high) by gender. This was consistent with the results in comparing intuition scores by
gender.
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Interviews
The most noticeable trait among the 8 health care team members who were
interviewed was their hesitancy to acknowledge the role of intuition in their practices.
This was repeated in several of the interviews and summarized the most clearly in the
final interview:
I think we can train people on the science (of health care), [but] it is really hard to
understand the art or the intuition side, and because we do not understand it very
well, we have a very hard time training people on it. And, in fact, we don’t – we
barely even talk about it anymore. (Interview 8)
Conclusions
The first conclusion is that intuition does play a role in health care team members’
daily activities. The acknowledgement and use of intuition varies between disciplines. In
this study, health care team members who voluntarily submitted AE UORs documented
more constructs of intuition than health care team members who submitted NM UORs.
Experienced health care team members who were asked to talk about intuition in daily
practice found it easier to describe how other practitioners used intuition rather than talk
about personal use. A number of supplementary questions arose: Do the health care team
members sense that something is wrong, but do not act on or have knowledge about the
medical error in time? Are they not empowered to stop or prevent a medical error? Only
2 of the 8 health care team members who were interviewed articulated all five of
Welling’s (2005) phases of intuition, yet each person articulated the use of intuition. Is
that because the health care system does not recognize, understand, or utilize intuition to
the fullest potential?
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The second conclusion is that the concept of intuition in daily practice needs
to have more emphasis in the curriculum for all employees. If experienced health care
team members had difficulty articulating the use of personal intuition, perhaps
insufficient time has been allotted in school- and work-related curricula to concentrate on
the concept. This externalization of moving from tacit to explicit knowledge needs to be
developed and incorporated into academic curriculum (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). The
notion of assimilating intuition into work-related curriculum could be accomplished in a
variety of ways.
Schön’s (1983) perspective of incorporating intuition would see health care team
members being dependent upon skill-based performance, tacit recognition, and personal
judgments, even in the face of evidence-based research. For nursing, Benner (1984)
described this as the time of joining theoretical knowledge with life experiences, thus
changing the individual’s perspective. Mezirow and Associates (2000) theorized that
individuals create structure or make meaning from experiences based on the centrality of
experience, critical reflection, and rational discourse in order to avoid chaos. What three
ideas have in common is the empowerment of the individual practitioner to take control
of a situation to determine a different outcome.
The third conclusion is that team versus individual intuition may better serve to
prevent medical errors from reaching hospitalized patients. The scope of this research
was to examine the role of intuition in preventing medical errors. Although not clearly
articulated, the assumption was to study individual intuition versus team intuition. The
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results demonstrated a difference between pharmacy and nursing, in particular female
pharmacists. Instead of focusing on the individual’s use of intuition, studying and
developing team intuition may better serve health care in general. This is evidenced in the
team-based learning model used at Baylor College of Medicine that encompasses
individual versus group accountability, the necessity for group interaction, and the
motivation to engage in give-and-take discussion (Michaelsen, Fink, & Knight, 1997).
This is an example of how teams become empowered to change the face of health care.
The sequel to this initial research would be to use the same hospital setting to study
where team intuition exists as part of the existing culture.
Recommendations for Action
Based on this research, curriculum for students, residents, and new employees
should have time allotted to teaching not only the science but also the art of health care in
the form of intuition, and what that means for health care team members as individuals
and as part of a team. This could be accomplished through curriculum and mentoring on
critical-thinking skills, team building, and critical conversations between and among team
members. Storytelling is an example of how to disseminate such learnings. Denning
(2001) commented, “Storytelling enables the individuals in an organization to see
themselves and the organization in a different light, and accordingly take decisions and
change their behavior in accordance with this new perceptions, insights, and identities
(pp. xiv-xv). This would need to be supported by senior administrative and physician
leaders as a change in the culture for the organization. However, it is not merely getting
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the right information or knowledge to individuals, there is the additional step of
engaging the individuals to learn and make use of the knowledge (J. Thomas et al., 2001).
One model for leading this transformational change would be to use principles
from Bridges (2003) or Kotter (1996). Enabling a sense of urgency to use intuition in the
daily practice of health care team members can be accomplished by presenting a burning
platform for change; in this case, it is the prevention of medical errors from reaching
hospitalized patients. The guiding coalition would be the senior administrative and
physician leaders, who would create, communicate, and empower health care team
members to use intuition in the same way as they currently use evidence-based medicine.
This type of change would require senior leaders to seek out and reward individuals or
teams for incorporating the use of intuition into daily practice. The credibility to change
current processes, from didactic learning only to incorporating experiences into daily
practice, leads to institutionalizing intuition as an acceptable and expected form of
practice. Examples of this are seen in national patient safety activities, such as situational
awareness, crucial conversations, TeamSTEPPS™, or handovers (Joint Commission,
2007d; U.S. Department of Defense, 2008). In this case, it would be moving from the
explicit to tacit knowledge or internalization. “When experiences through socialization,
externalization, and combination are internalized into individuals’ tacit knowledge bases
in the form of shared mental models or technical know-how, they become valuable
assets” (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, p. 69).
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Recommendations for Further Study
Further research is needed to understand in more detail what happens when health
care team members prevent medical errors from reaching hospitalized patients. Five
potential topics for future study arose from this research. The first would be to understand
the significance of prayer as a construct of intuition and its relationship to intuition. Of
interest would be to compare religious versus secular health care facilities. Another area
of study would be to understand how health care team members use intuition on a daily
basis. This would require interviews, direct observations, and the mapping of individuals’
critical-thinking processes.
The third would be to study the differences between and among disciplines, for
example, pharmacy, nursing, or diagnostic imaging, regarding the use of intuition. The
fourth idea would be to see how storytelling impacts health care team members’
utilization of intuition in their daily practice. Storytelling or sharing knowledge as an
informal and economical knowledge management system can be utilized across
disciplines, departments, and units as part of an organizational strategy (Denning, 2001;
Snowden, 2000). Finally, although the study sample was small, further research by
patient safety advocates in health care should continue to examine documented comments
in UORs and differences between pharmacy and other disciplines regarding the use of
intuition.
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Social Change Implications
Health care is a dynamic organism that is constantly growing and evolving.
Technological innovations occur daily, new medications are approved and added to
hospital formularies, advances in evidenced-based medicine are widespread in the
literature, and new equipment is available. All of these enhancements contribute to
societal expectations that most disease states are fixable. However, advances can come
with a price, which often is the sacrifice of time and knowledge, which leads to an unsafe
health care environment. Between 44, 000 and 98,000 people die each year as the result
of medical errors (Kohn et al., 2000). The cost associated with these errors surpasses $29
billion annually (Al-Assaf, Bumpus, Carter, & Dixon, 2003). The normalized deviance of
this high cost of medical errors has led to regulatory requirements with attached financial
incentives.
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and the Joint
Commission have formalized the societal demands on health care to improve patient
safety. Effective October 1, 2008, the CMS no longer paid for preventable errors and
never events that occur during a hospitalization, such as patient falls, hospital-acquired
pressure ulcers or infections, or retained foreign bodies after a surgical procedure. This
lack of reimbursement will affect health care. Senior leaders are actively seeking ways
not only to quantify the number of never events but also to prevent medical errors. This is
Christensen’s (1997) idea of a disruptive innovation that causes a shift in the customary
health care models to sufficiently cause social change.
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On way to prevent medical errors is to place a greater emphasis on the role of
an NM. One strategy may be to model the health care industry’s culture after other highrisk industries such as aviation (Al-Assaf et al., 2003). This means not only creating a
mechanism for reporting medical errors but also establishing a culture that seeks to
balance the need to learn from mistakes while holding individuals accountable for actions
outside of established norms and standards (Behal, 2004; Bogner, 1994; Morath &
Turnbull, 2005; Rosenthal & Sutcliffe, 2002). This includes empowering the health care
team members to participate more openly in acknowledging and managing medical
errors.
Empowerment is a dynamic process that is part of building self-confidence for the
individual or the team. Schön (1983) described this as when the individual begins to trust
the internal mechanism of incorporating skills, tacit recognition, and personal judgment.
To trust personal judgment in the face of evidence-based research takes an empowered
individual. Some find it easier to dismiss the use of intuition, to not trust that internal
instinctual knowledge, especially when faced with group think or traditional practices.
Empowering the individual or the team to trust and use intuition is part of shedding the
feelings of powerlessness or resignation. Changing the structure of how health care team
members learn to incorporate skills, namely, tacit recognition, intuition, and personal
judgment, is part of helping to eliminate the feelings of powerlessness or resignation as to
why medical errors occur. The potential benefits to society include financial savings by
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preventing costly errors and rework, and safer health care systems that reduce or
eliminate medical errors, all of which contribute to better care for patients.
Reflection on the Researcher’s Experience
Although not as much new knowledge was forthcoming from the actual proposal,
there was much learning regarding the research process. Several factors come to mind
about the design of the study. For example, a pilot of the design would have been
beneficial in tightening the scope and focusing the work. Having a small sample size to
test the AIM Inventory (Agor, 1984) results would have aided in setting up the database
and running the statistical analysis. Piloting the data collection process would have
improved the actual tools sent to the participants. There was insufficient room on the
inventory for the comments by participants. A pilot would have revealed this
shortcoming, and adjustments could have been made prior to the actual data collection.
Piloting the interviews would have smoothed the transition of the researcher in
reordering the interview questions. This may have solicited more in-depth comments
from the health care team members. Having a larger sample size to interview would have
been helpful. Klein’s (2001) methodology of direct observation and interviews would
have gained additional insights and knowledge into the role of intuition in preventing
medical errors. The learnings for the researcher would have been that a basic interview
for such a complex subject matter is an insufficient methodology.
Piloting the interviews also would have provided the researcher with information
to ask different research questions. Using the interviews as a pilot would have suggested

121
that asking more direct questions about the participants’ personal beliefs regarding
intuition and setting the questions up using Welling’s (2005) five phases could have
provided more in-depth information from the participants. Recommendations to improve
on this study include having a larger sample size; piloting the entire research design;
focusing more on direct observations, along with interviews, to glean more knowledge
about the process of intuition; expanding the scope to investigate individual versus team
intuition; and creating a subset of health care team members to interview, namely, those
individuals who received low intuitive scores versus high intuitive scores.
Summary
Preventing medical errors from reaching hospitalized patients is a fundamental
aspect of providing safe patient care. Human and systems errors occur at a greater rate
each year. Finding ways to prevent medical errors from occurring is important to health
care team members as well as society as a whole. This study began an exploration into
the role of intuition in preventing medical errors.
No differences were found when comparing mean intuition scores by type of error
and level of intuition score (low, medium, high) by age or gender of the participants.
There were differences when comparing the number of documented constructs of
intuition by type of error and when stratifying error type (NM) by discipline, that is,
pharmacy to nursing and diagnostic imaging. Eight health care team members were
interviewed to describe times when they prevented medical errors from reaching
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hospitalized patients. Two of the 8 participants articulated Welling’s (2005) five
stages of intuition.
Further research is needed to understand how health care team members use
intuition daily. Studies might include interviews, direct observations, as well as the
mapping of the individuals’ critical-thinking processes. Additional study is needed to
understand the differences between and among disciplines in the use of intuition to
prevent medical errors. Future studies may investigate the similarities and differences in
team intuition versus individual intuition in preventing medical errors from reaching
patients. This research is important for patient safety advocates, risk managers,
administrators, and physician leaders within health care. The information and support for
further research should be disseminated through professional journals, conferences, or
national organizations.
Encouraging health care team members to use intuition changes the culture of
safety within an organization by explicitly stating the expectation of senior leaders and
mangers for the individual to internalize policy, procedures, and evidence-based practice
with critical thinking and experience. The empowerment of the individual to incorporate
didactic learning and experience with the reflective judgment of intuition will lead to
significant change regarding patient safety. One small aspect of learning to trust and use
intuition can lead to positive change and outcomes in health care.

REFERENCES
Abdelhamid, T., & Everett, J. (2000). Identifying root causes of construction accidents.
Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 126(1), 52-60.
Adams, E. (1976). Accident causation and management systems. Professional Safety, 8,
77-81.
Agar, M. (1986). Speaking of ethnography: Qualitative research methods series 2.
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Agor, W. (1984). Intuitive management: Integrating left and right brain management
skills. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Agor, W. (1986). How top executives use their intuition to make important decisions.
Business Horizons, 29(1), 49-53. Retrieved from Business Source Premier
database.
Agor, W. (1989). Intuition in organizations: Leading and managing productively.
Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Al-Assaf, A., Bumpus, L., Carter, D., & Dixon, S. (2003). Preventing errors in health
care: A call for action. Hospital Topics, 81(3), 5-12.
Alexandersson, E. (2003). Human error in aviation: An overview with special attention
to slips and lapses. Retrieved from http://www.flygforsk.lu.se/files/Human_Error.
pdf
Ambady, N. (1991). Predicting a lot from a little: Thin slices of behavior as predictors of
interpersonal consequences. Dissertations Abstracts International, 52(5B), 2817.
(UMI No. 9131902)
Ambady, N., Hallahan, M., & Conner, B. (1999). Accuracy of judgments of sexual
orientation from thin slices of behavior. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 77(3), 538-547.
Ambady, N., Krabbenhoft, M., & Hogan, D. (2006). The 30-sec sale: Using thin-slice
judgments to evaluate sales effectiveness. Journal of Consumer Psychology,
16(1), 4-13.

124
Ambady, N., & Rosenthal, R. (1993). Half a minute: Predicting teach evaluations
from this slices of nonverbal behavior and physical attractiveness. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 64(3), 431-441. Retrieved from PsycINFO
database.
Askell-Williams, H., & Lawson, M. (2006). Multi-dimensional profiling of medical
students’ cognitive models about learning. Medical Education, 40, 138-145.
Auerbach, C., & Silverstein, L. (2003). Qualitative data: An introduction to coding and
analysis. New York: New York University Press.
Babbie, E. (2004). The practice of social research (10th ed.). Belmont, CA:
Wadsworth/Thomson Learning.
Bastick, T. (1982). Intuition: How we think and act. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Batson, R., Ray, P., Wan Q, & Weems, W. (2000). How preventive maintenance impacts
plant safety. Retrieved from http://ie.eng.ua.edu/research/MRC/PM~plant~
safety~pap.doc
Bazeley, P., & Richards, L. (2005). The NVivo qualitative project book. Thousand Oaks,
CA: Sage.
Bechara, A., & Damasio, H. (1997). Deciding advantageously before knowing the
advantageous strategy. Science, 275(5304), 1293-1295.
Behal, R. (2004). An organization development framework for transformational changes
in patient safety: A guide for hospital senior leaders. In B. Youngberg & M.
Hatlie (Eds.), The patient safety handbook (pp. 51-65). Sudbury, MA: Jones and
Bartlett.
Belenky, M., Clinchy, B., Goldberger, N., & Tarule, J. (1997). Women’s ways of
knowing: The development of self, voice, and mind. New York: Basic Books.
Benner, P. (1984). From novice to expert: Excellence and power in clinical nursing
practice. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall Health.
Benner, P., & Tanner, C. (1987). How expert nurses use intuition. American Journal of
Nursing, 87, 23-31. Retrieved from CINAHL database.

125
Benner, P., Tanner, C., & Chesla, C. (1992). From beginner to expert: Gaining a
differentiate clinical world in critical care nursing. Advances in Nursing Science,
14(3), 13-28.
Benson, D. (1994). The neurology of thinking. New York: Oxford University Press.
Beyea, S. (2002). Wake-up call – Standardization is crucial to eliminating medication
errors. Association of Operating Room Nurses Journal, 75(5), 1010-1013.
Retrieved from CINAHL database.
Biddle, C., & Lahaye, L. (2003). Understanding human error in health care: Part I
definitions, epidemiology, and enlightened consideration. Curriculum Review
Nursing Anesthesia, 25(6), 67-76. Retrieved from CINAHL database.
Bird, F., & Loftus, R. (1976). Loss control management. Loganville, GA: Institute Press.
Bloom, B. S. (Ed.). (1956). Taxonomy of educational objectives, Volume 1. New York:
McKay.
Bogner, M. (1994). Human error in medicine. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Boyle, D., Schulmeister, L., Lajeunesse, J., & Anderson, R. (2002). Medication
misadventure in cancer care. Seminars in Oncology Nursing, 18(2), 109-120.
Brennan, T., Leape, L., Laird, N., Hebert, L., Localio, A., Lawthers, A., et al. (1991).
Incidence of adverse events and negligence in hospitalized patients: results of the
Harvard Medical Practice Study I. New England Journal of Medicine, 324, 370376.
Brennan, T., Leape, L., Laird, N., Hebert, L., Localio, A., Lawthers, A., et al. (2004).
Incidence of adverse events and negligence in hospitalized patients: Results of the
Harvard Medical Practice Study I. Quality & Safety in Health Care, 13(2), 145152.
Bridges, W. (2003). Managing transitions: Making the most of change. New York:
Perseus.
Briggs Myers, I., McCaulley, M., Quenk, N., & Hammer, A. (1998). MBTI manual: A
guide to the development and use of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (3rd ed.).
Palo Alto, CA: Counseling Psychologists Press.
Brook, Q. (2006). Six sigma and Minitab®. London: QSB Consulting.

126
Brookfield, S. (1987). Developing critical thinkers: Challenging adults to explore
alternative ways of thinking and acting. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Buckingham, C., & Adams, A. (2000). Classifying clinical decision-making: A unifying
approach. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 32(4), 981-989. Retrieved from
CINAHL database.
Burns, R. (2000). Introduction to research methods (4th ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Cacioppo, J., & Petty, R. (1982). The need for cognition. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 42, 116-131. Retrieved from PsycINFO database.
Cader, R., Campbell, S., & Watson, D. (2005). Cognitive continuum theory in nursing
decision-making. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 49(4), 397-405.
Caffarella, R. (2002). Planning programs for adult learners (2nd ed.). San Francisco:
Jossey-Bass.
Cappon, D. (1993). The anatomy of intuition. Psychology Today, 26(3), 40-50. Retrieved
from PsycINFO database.
Carrère, S., & Gottman, J. (1999). Predicting divorce among newlyweds from the first
three minutes of a marital conflict discussion. Family Process, 38(3), 293-301.
Retrieved from SocINDEX database.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2008). NIOSH safety and health topics:
Healthcare workers. Retrieved from http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/health care
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid. (2008). Incorporating selected national quality
forum and never events into Medicare’s list of hospital-acquired conditions.
Retrieved from http://www.cms.hhs.gov
Chambers, E. (2000). Applied ethnography. In N. Denzin & Y. Lincoln (Eds.), Handbook
of qualitative research (2nd ed., pp. 851-869). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Chiba, T., Aonuma, S., & Kusugami, T. (2003). Research on method of human error
analysis using 4M4E. Retrieved from www.jreast.co.jp/e/development/tech/pdf_
5/Tec-05-59-65eng.pdf
Christensen, C. (1997). Innovator’s dilemma: When new technology causes great firms to
fail. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.

127
Christensen, C., Baumann, H., Ruggles, R., & Sadtler, T. (2006). Disruptive
innovation for social change. Harvard Business Review, 84(12), 94-101.
Retrieved from Business Source Premier database.
Christensen, C., Bohmer, R., & Kenagy, J. (2000). Will disruptive innovations cure
healthcare? Harvard Business Review, 78(4), 102-112. Retrieved from Business
Source Premier database.
Clark, D. (1999). Learning domains or Bloom’s taxonomy: The three types of learning.
Retrieved from http://www.nwlink.com/~donclark/hrd/bloom.html#two
Cohen, M. (Ed.) (1999). Medication errors: Causes, prevention, and risk management.
Sudbury, MA: Jones and Bartlett.
Cohen, M., Kahn, D., & Steeves, R. (2000). Hermeneutic phenomenological research: A
practical guide for nurse researchers. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Connor, M., Ponte, P., & Conway, J. (2002). Multidisciplinary approaches to reducing
error and risk in a patient care setting. Critical Care Nursing Clinics of North
America, 14(4), 359-367.
Coombes, F. (2005). Intuition at work. Positive Health, 12, 9-11.
Cosby, K. (2003). A framework for classifying factors that contributes to error in the
emergency department. Annals of Emergency Medicine, 42(6), 815-823.
Crandall, B., & Getchell-Reiter, K. (1993). Critical decision method: A technique for
eliciting concrete assessment indicators from the intuition of NICU nurses.
Advanced Nursing Science, 16(1), 42-51. Retrieved from CINAHL database.
Crandall, B., Klein, G., & Hoffman, R. (2006). Working minds: A practitioner’s guide to
cognitive task analysis. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Creswell, J. (1998). Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five
traditions. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Cullen, E., & Fein, A. (2005). Why stories are essential to effective safety training.
Cincinnati, OH: NIOSH.
Curhan, J., & Pentland, A. (2007). Thin slices of negotiation: Predicting outcomes from
conversational dynamics within the first 5 minutes. Journal of Applied
Psychology, 92(3), 802-811. Retrieved from PsycINFO database.

128
Dane, E., & Pratt, M. (2007). Exploring intuition and its role in managerial decisionmaking. Academy of Management Review, 32(1), 33-54. Retrieved from
PsycINFO database.
Davis, D., Grove, S., & Knowles, P. (1990). An experimental application of personality
type as an analogue for decision-making style. Psychological Reports, 66, 167175. Retrieved from PsycINFO database.
Davis, M. (2004). Communication failure blamed for sentinel events. Health care Risk
Management, 26(1), 8.
Davenport, T., & Prusak, L. (2000). Working knowledge: How organizations manage
what they know. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
Deikman, A. (1998). Intuition. In H. Palmer (Ed.), Inner knowing: Consciousness,
creativity, insight, and intuition (pp. 176-184). New York: Tarcher/Putnam.
Dekker, S. (2002). The field guide to human error investigations. Hampshire, England:
Ashgate.
DeMott, N. (1995). A gut feeling. Nursing, 95(2), 64. Retrieved from CINAHL database.
Denning, S. (2001). The springboard: How storytelling ignites action in knowledge-era
organizations. Boston: Butterworth Heinemann.
Dijksterhuis, A. (2006). A theory of unconscious thought. Perspectives on Psychological
Science, 1(2), 95-109.
DoBias, M. (2006). Lifting the lid off pricing: With HHS moving to post what it pays for
common procedures, the debate over health care pricing transparency is heating
up. Modern Health care, 36(12), 6-7, 16. Retrieved from MEDLINE database.
Donald, J. (2002). Learning to think: Disciplinary perspectives. San Francisco: JosseyBass.
Dreyfus, H., & Dreyfus, S. (1986). Mind over machines: The power of human intuition
and expertise in the era of the computer. New York: Free Press.
Dundam, N. (2003). Causal-comparative research. Retrieved from www.cofc.edu/~
ndundam/EDFSSPRG200/Chapter%2012.doc

129
Effken, J. (2000). Informational basis for expert intuition. Journal of Advanced
Nursing, 34(2), 246-255. Retrieved from CINAHL database.
English, I. (1993). Intuition as a function of the expert nurse: A critique of Benner’s
novice to exert model. Journal of Advanced Nursing 18, 387-393. Retrieved from
CINAHL database.
Epstein, R. (1999). Mindful practice. Journal of American Medical Association, 282(9),
833-839. Retrieved from CINAHL database.
Erlandson, D., Harris, E., Skipper, B., & Allen, S. (1993). Doing naturalistic inquiry: A
guide to methods. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Familoni, O. (2002). Intuition, the hidden intelligence: Factors that influence intuition in
decision making of leaders from Nigeria and the United States. ProQuest
Information and Learning Company, AAT 3069963 (UMI No. 3069963)
Faugier, J. (2005). Basic instincts. Nursing Standards, 19(2), 14-15. Retrieved from
CINAHL database.
Fortune, J., & Peters, G. (1995). Learning from failure: The systems approach.
Chichester, West Sussex, England: John Wiley & Sons.
Fuller, S. (2002). Knowledge management foundations. Boston: Butterworth-Heinemann.
Giardina, E. (2000). Heart disease in women. International Journal of Fertility and
Women’s Medicine, 45(6), 350-357.
Gibbs, G. (2004). Qualitative data analysis: Explorations with NVivo. New York: Open
University Press.
Gilbert, D., Pelham, B., & Krull, D. (1988). On cognitive busyness: When person
perceivers meet, persons perceived. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 54, 733-740. Retrieved from PsycINFO database.
Gibson, J. (1979). The ecological approach to visual perception. Boston: Houghton
Mifflin.
Gladwell, M. (2005). Blink: The power of thinking without thinking. New York: Little,
Brown, and Company.

130
Goldman, D. (2006). System failure versus personal accountability: The case of clean
hands. New England Journal of Medicine, 355(2), 121-123.
Gosling, S., Ko, S., Mannarelli, T., & Morris, M. (2002). A room with a cue: Personality
judgments based on offices and bedrooms. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 82(3), 379-398. Retrieved from SocINDEX database.
Gubrium, J., & Holstein, J. (2000). Analyzing interpretive practice. In N. Denzin & Y.
Lincoln (Eds.), Handbook of qualitative research (2nd ed., pp. 487-508).
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Haig, K. (2003). One hospital’s journey toward patient safety: A cultural evolution.
Retrieved from http://www.medscape.com.viewaricle/460721
Hall, K. (2002). Reviewing intuitive decision-making and uncertainty: The implications
for medical education. Medical Education, 36, 216-224.
Hammond, K. (1984). Principles of organization in intuitive and analytical cognition
(Report 231). Boulder, CO: Center for Research on Judgment and Policy,
University of Colorado.
Hansman, C. (2001). Contest-based adult learning. In S. Merriam (Ed.), The new update
on adult learning theory (pp. 43-51). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Harriss, A. (2004). Erring on the side of danger. Occupational Health, 56(4), 24-27.
Hayes, E., Flannery, D., Brooks, A., Tisdell, E., & Hugo, J. (2002). Women as learners:
The significance of gender in adult learning. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Heath, H. (1998). Reflection and patterns of knowing in nursing. Journal of Advanced
Nursing 27, 1054-1059.
Heinrich, H. (1959). Industrial accident prevention: A scientific approach. New York:
McGraw-Hill.
Helmreich, R. (1999). Culture, threat, and error: Assessing system safety. Paper
presented at the meeting of the Royal Aeronautical Society on Safety in Aviation:
The Management Commitment, London, England.
Helmreich, R. (2000). On error management: Lessons from aviation. British Medical
Journal, 320, 781-785.

131
Henderson, G. (2006). Six-sigma quality improvement with Minitab. Hoboken, NJ:
John Wiley & Sons.
Henneman, E., & Gawlinski, A. (2004). A “near miss” model for describing the nurse’s
role in the recovery of medical errors. Journal of Professional Nursing, 20(3),
196-201.
Hobbs, A., & Williamson, A. (2002). Skills, rules, and knowledge in aircraft
maintenance: Errors in context. Ergonomics, 45(4), 290-308.
Hogarth, R. (2005). Deciding analytically or trusting your intuition? The advantages and
disadvantages of analytic and intuitive thought. In T. Betsch & S. Haberstroh
(Eds.), The routines of decision making (pp. 67-82). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Hsieh, D. (1995). Representationalism and perceptual error. Retrieved from
http://enlightenment.supersaturated.com/essays/text/dianamertzhsieh/percept_erro
r.html
Hutchinson, A. (2005). Analyzing audio-recorded data: Using computer software
applications. Nurse Researcher, 12(3), 20-31.
Institute of Medicine. (2001). Crossing the quality chasm: A new health system for the
21st century. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
Institute of Medicine. (2004). Patient safety: Achieving a new standard for care.
Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
Institute of Medicine. (2006). Preventing medication errors. Retrieved from
http://www.iom.edu/Object.File/Master/35/943/medication%20errors%20new.pdf
Institute for Safe Medication Practices. (2007). Education and awareness. Retrieved from
http://www.ismp.org
Isenberg, D. (1989). How senior managers think. In W. Agor (Ed.), Intuition in
organizations: Leading and managing productively (pp. 91-110). Newbury Park,
CA: Sage.
Jacobs, L. (1998). Personal knowing in cancer nursing. Nursing Forum, 33(4), 23-28.
Janney, M. (1993). The relationship between intuitive ability as well as actual use of
intuition, and the hierarchical level of nurse manager. Dissertation Abstracts
International, 55(02), 366B. (UMI No. 9413235)

132
Johannsen, G. (1988). Categories of human operator behavior in fault management
situations. In L. Goodstein, H. Andersen, & S. Olsen (Eds.), Tasks, errors and
mental models (pp. 251-258). London: Taylor & Francis.
Joint Commission. (2006a). Patient safety. Retrieved from http://www.jointcommission.
org/Patient Safety
Joint Commission. (2006b). 2006 national patient safety goals. Retrieved from
http://www.jointcommission.org/NR/rdonlyres/88ED0EA4-395A-4DBA-A12E25C70AF72C00/0/06_npsg.ppt
Joint Commission. (2007a). Nine patient safety solutions. Retrieved from
http://www.ccforpatientsafety.org/30723
Joint Commission. (2007b). Sentinel event alerts. Lessons learned: Wrong site surgery,
August 1998. Retrieved from http://www.jointcommission.org/Sentinel
Events/SentinelEventAlert
Joint Commission. (2007c). Sentinel event policy and procedures updated: March 2007.
Retrieved from http://www.jointcommission.org/NR/rdonlyres/690008C7-EAB24275-BC7B-68B37481D658/0/SE_Chap_Sept06.pdf
Joint Commission. (2007d). Sentinel event statistics. Retrieved from http://www.joint
commission.org/NR/rdonlyres/74540565-4D0F-4992-863E-8F9E949E6B56/0/
SE_Stats_12_06.pdf
Jung, C. (1971). Psychological type. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Kahneman, D. (2003). A perspective on judgment and choice: Mapping bounded
rationality. American Psychologist, 58(9), 697-720. Retrieved from PsycINFO
database.
Keirsey, D. (1998). Please understand me II: Temperament character intelligence. Del
Mar, CA: Prometheus Nemesis Books.
Kennedy, D. (2004). Analysis of sharp-end, frontline human error: Beyond throwing out
“bad apples.” Journal of Nursing Care and Quality, 19(2), 116-122.
Killen, A., & Beyea, S. (2003). Learning from NMs in an effort to promote patient safety.
Association of Operating Room Nurses Journal, 77(2), 423.

133
King, P., & Kitchener, K. (1994). Developing reflective judgment: Understanding
and promoting intellectual growth and critical thinking in adolescents and adults.
San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Kirwan, B. (1994). A guide to practical human reliability assessment. Bristol, PA: Taylor
& Francis.
Klein, G. (2001). Sources of power: How people make decisions. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press.
Klein, G. (2003). The power of intuition. New York: Currency Books.
Kline, D. (2005). Intuitive team decision making. In H. Montgomery, R. Lipshitz, & B.
Brehmer (Eds.), How professionals make decisions (pp. 171-182). Mahwah, NJ:
Erlbaum.
Knowles, M., Holton, E., & Swanson, R. (1998). The adult learner: The definitive classic
in adult education and human resource development (5th ed.). Woburn, MA:
Butterworth-Heinemann.
Kohn, L., Corrigan, J., & Donaldson, M. (2000). To err is human: Building a safer health
system. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
Kondro, W. (2004). Canadian report quantifies cost of medical errors. Lancet, 363(9426),
2059.
Koppel, R., Metlay, J., Cohen, A., Abaluck, B., Localio, A., Kimmel, S., et al. (2005).
Role of computerized physician order entry systems in facilitating medication
errors. Journal of American Medical Association, 293(10), 1197-1203. Retrieved
from MEDLINE database.
Kotter, J. (1996). Leading change. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
Krathwohl, D., Bloom, B., & Masia, B. (1964). Taxonomy of educational objectives:
Handbook II: Affective domain. New York: David McKay.
Kroeger, O., & Thuesen, J. (1988). Typetalk. New York: Dell.
Landrigan, C., Rothschild, J., Cronin, J., Kaushal, R., Burdick, E., Katz, J., et al. (2004).
Effect of reducing interns’ work hours on serious medical errors in intensive care
units. New England Journal of Medicine, 351(18), 1838-1848.

134
Latino, R. (1994). What is the difference between failure analysis (FA), root cause
analysis (RCA), and root cause failure analysis (RCRA)? Retrieved from
http://www.reliability.com/articles/article50.htm
Lave, J., & Wenger, E. (1991). Situated learning: Legitimate peripheral participation.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Leamon, T. (2006). Successful safety programmes. Retrieved from http://www.ilo.org/
encyclopedia/?doc&nd=857100090&nh=0
Leape, L. (1998). The fallacies of failure. Hospitals & Health Networks, 72, 14.
Leape, L., Brennan, T., Laird, N., Lawthers, A., Localio, A., Barnes, B., et al. (1991).
The nature of adverse events in hospitalized patients: Results of the Harvard
Medical Practice Study II. New England Journal of Medicine, 324(6), 377-384.
Leedy, P., & Ormrod, J. (2001). Practical research: Planning and design (7th ed.). Upper
Saddle River: NJ: Merrill Prentice Hall.
Leonard, M., Graham, S., & Bonacum, D. (2004). The human factor: The critical
importance of effective teamwork and communication in providing safe care.
Quality Safety in Health Care, 13, 185-190.
Levine, D. (2006). Statistics for six sigma green belts with Minitab® and JMP™. Upper
Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall.
Lewins, A., & Silver, C. (2006). Choosing a CAQDAS package. Retrieved from
http://caqdas.soc.surrey.ac.uk/ChoosingLewins&SilverV5July06.pdf
Liebowitz, J., & Wright, K. (1999). A look toward valuating human capital. In J.
Liebowitz, (Ed.), Knowledge management: Handbook (pp. 5-1 – 5-11). Boca
Raton, FL: CRC Press.
Lyons, M., Adams, S., Woloshynowych, M., & Vincent, C. (2004). Human reliability
analysis in health care: A review of techniques. International Journal of Risk &
Safety in Medicine, 16, 223-237. Retrieved from MEDLINE database.
Mach, E. (1975). Knowledge and error. New York: Springer-Verlag.
Marshall, C., & Rossman, G. (2006). Designing qualitative research (4th ed.). Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage.

135
Matlin, M. (2002). Cognition (5th ed.). South Melbourne, Victoria, Australia:
Wadsworth Thomson.
McCarter, T., Centafont, R., Daly, R., Kokoricha, T., & Leander Po, J. (2003). Reducing
medication errors: A regional approach for hospitals. Drug Safety, 26(13), 937950. Retrieved from MEDLINE database.
McClanahan, S., Goodwin, S., & Houser, F. (2000). A formula for errors: Good people +
bad systems. In P. Spath (Ed.), Error reduction in health care (pp. 1-16). San
Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
McCormack, B. (1992). Intuition: Concept analysis and application to curriculum
development, I. Content analysis. Journal of Clinical Nursing, 1, 329-344.
Retrieved from CINAHL database.
McCormack, B. (1993). Intuition: Concept analysis and application to curriculum
development, II. Application to curriculum development. Journal of Clinical
Nursing, 2, 11-17. Retrieved from CINAHL database.
McCutcheon, H., & Pincombe, J. (2001). Intuition: An important tool in the practice of
nursing. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 35(3), 342-348. Retrieved from CINAHL
database.
McElroy, M. (2003). The new knowledge management: Complexity, learning, and
sustainable innovation. Boston: Butterworth-Heinemann.
McKinnon, J. (2005). Feeling and knowing: Neural scientific perspectives on intuitive
practice. Nursing Standard, 20(1), 41-46.
Merriam, S., & Caffarella, R. (1999). Learning in adulthood: A comprehensive guide (2nd
ed.). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Mezirow, J. (1991). Transformative dimensions of adult learning. San Francisco: JosseyBass.
Mezirow, J., and Associates, Eds. (2000). Learning as transformation: Critical
perspectives on a theory in progress. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Michaelsen, L., Fink, L., & Knight, A. (1997). Designing effective group activities:
Lessons for classroom teaching and faculty development. In D. DeZure (Ed.), To
improve the academy: Resources for faculty, instructional and organizational
development (pp. 373-397). Stillwater, OK: New Forums Press.

136
Miles, M., & Huberman, A. (1994). Qualitative data analysis. Thousand Oaks, CA:
Sage.
Miller, L. (2003). Safety promotion and error reduction in perinatal care: Lessons from
industry. Journal of Perinatal and Neonatal Nursing, 17(2), 128-138.
Minick, P., & Harvey, S. (2003). The early recognition of patient problems among
medical-surgical nurses. MEDSURG Nursing, 12(5), 291-297.
Minitab® Statistical Software. (2008). Minitab v14. State College, PA.
Morath, J., & Turnbull, J. (2005). To do no harm: Ensuring patient safety in health care
organizations. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Moustakas, C. (1994). Phenomenological research methods. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Myers, D. (2002). Intuition: Its powers and perils. New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press.
National Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting and Prevention. (2001).
NCC MERP index for categorizing medication errors algorithm. Retrieved from
http://www.nccmerp.org/pdf/algorBW2001-06-12.pdf
New York State Department of Health. (2004). Blood and tissue resource, Subpart 582.16, required standards for transfusion. Statutory Authority: Public Health Law,
sections 3121(5), and 3124. Retrieved from http://www.wadsworth. org/labcert/
regaffairs/bloodbanks/index.htm#58-2.16
Nonaka, I., & Takeuchi, H. (1995). The knowledge-creating company. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Norman, D. (1988). The psychology of everyday things. New York: Basic Books.
Novak, J., & Gowin, D. (1984). Learning how to learn. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press.
Osbeck, L. (1999). Conceptual problems in the development of a psychological notion of
intuition. Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior, 29(3), 229-249.
Patterson, E., Render, M., & Ebright, P. (2002). Repeating human performance themes in
five health care adverse events. Paper presented at the 46th annual meeting of the
Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, Baltimore, MD.

137
Pennsylvania State University. (2007). Research protections. Retrieved from
http://www.research.psu.edu/orp/areas/humans/policies/guide11.asp
Perrow, C. (1999). Normal accidents: Living with high-risk technology. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Perry, M. (2000). Reflections on intuition and expertise. Journal of Clinical Nursing, 9,
137-145.
Phillips, J., Klein, G., & Sieck, W. (2004). Expertise in judgment and decision-making: A
case for training intuitive decision skills. In D. Koehler & N. Harvey (Eds.),
Blackwell handbook of judgment & decision making (pp. 297-315). Malden, MA:
Blackwell.
Polanyi, M. (1966). The tacit dimension. Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith.
Poniatowski, L. (2004). Patient safety and error reduction standards: The JCAHO
response to the IOM report. In B. Youngberg & M. Hatlie (Eds.), The patient
safety handbook (pp. 127-144). Sudbury, MA: Jones and Bartlett.
Proctor, R., & Van Zandt, T. (1994). Human factors: In simple and complex systems.
Needham Heights, MA: Allyn & Bacon.
Prusak, L. (1997). Knowledge in organizations. Boston: Butterworth-Heinemann.
Quality Interagency Coordination Task Force. (2000). Doing what counts for patient
safety: Federal actions to reduce medical errors and their impact. Retrieved from
http://www.quic.gov/report/copy%20of%20toc.htm
Quinn, J., & Anderson, P. (1996). Managing professional intellect: Making the most of
the best. Harvard Business Review, 74(2), 71-80.
Quinn, J., Anderson, P., & Finkelstein, S. (1998). Managing professional intellect:
Making the most of the best. In Harvard Business Review on Knowledge
Management (pp. 181-205). Boston: Harvard Business School.
Rasmussen, J. (1982). Human errors: A taxonomy for describing human malfunction in
industrial installations. Journal of Occupational Accidents, 4, 311-333. Retrieved
from EBSCO database.
Rasmussen, J. (1999). Ecological interface design for reliable human-machine systems.
International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 9(3), 203-223.

138
Reason, J. (1990). Human error. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Reason, J. (1997). Managing the risks of organizational accidents. Burlington, VT:
Ashgate.
Reason, J. (2000). Human error: Models and management. British Medical Journal, 320,
768-770. Retrieved from EBSCO database.
Reed, S. (2000). Cognition: Theory and application (5th ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth
Thomson.
Richards, L. (1999). Using NVivo in qualitative research. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Riso, D., & Hudson, R. (1996). Personality types: Using the enneagram for selfdiscovery. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Rogoff, B., & Gardner, W. (1984). Adult guidance of cognitive development. In B.
Rogoff & J. Lave (Eds.), Everyday cognition: Development in social context (pp.
95-116). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Rogoff, B., & Lave, J. (Eds.). (1999). Everyday cognition: Its development in social
context. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Rosenthal, M., & Sutcliffe, K. (2002). Medical error: What do we know? What do we
do? San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Rosser, R. (1994). Cognitive development: Psychological and biological perspectives.
Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
Ruth-Sahd, L., & Hendy, H. (2005). Predictors of novice nurses’ use of intuition to guide
patient care decisions. Journal of Nursing Education, 44(10), 450-458.
Sage, W. (2003). Medical liability and patient safety. Health Affairs, 22(4), 26-36.
Retrieved from CINAHL database.
Schenker, J., & Rumrill, P. (2004). Causal-comparative research designs. Journal of
Vocational Rehabilitation, 21(3), 117-121. Retrieved from Academic Search
Premier database.
Schön, D. (1983). The reflective practitioner: How professionals think in action. New
York: Basic Books.

139
Seels, B., & Glasgow, Z. (1997). Making instructional design decisions (2nd ed.).
Columbus OH: Merrill.
Seidel, J. (1998). Qualitative data analysis. Retrieved from http://www.qualisresearch.
com
Siddins, M. (2002). Audits, errors, and the misplace of clinical indicators: Revisiting the
quality in Australian health care study. ANZ Journal of Surgery, 72(11), 832-834.
Retrieved from MEDLINE database.
Sidorov, J., & Schlosberg, C. (2005). Disease management and the Medicare
Modernization Act: “It’s the insurance, stupid.” Disease Management, 8(6), 331338. Retrieved from MEDLINE database.
Simmons, J., & Nelson, L, (2006). Intuitive confidence: Choosing between intuitive and
nonnutritive alternatives. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 135(3),
409-428. Retrieved from PsycINFO database.
Sinclair, M., & Ashkanasy, N. (2005). Intuition: Myth or a decisions-making tool?
Management of Learning, 36(3), 353-370.
Smolensky, P. (1988). On the proper treatment of connectionism. Behavioral and Brain
Sciences, 11(1), 1-23. Retrieved from PsycINFO database.
Snowden, D. (1999). Three metaphors, two stories, and a picture. Knowledge
Management Review, 2(1), 30-33. Retrieved from Business Source Premier
database.
Snowden, D. (2000). The art and science of story or “Are you sitting uncomfortably?”
Business Information Review, 17(4), 215-226. Retrieved from Business Source
Premier database.
Sutherland, R. (2000). Dancing in the Cartesian theater: J. J. Gibson’s ecological
approach. Retrieved from http://www.ryansutherland.com/media/ecological
approach.pdf#search='Gibson's%20direct%20perception'
Tanner, C. (2006). Thinking like a nurse: A research-based model of clinical judgment in
nursing. Journal of Nursing Education, 45(6), 204-211. Retrieved from CINAHL
database.

140
Thomas, E., Studdert, D., Burstin, H., Orav, E., Zeena, T., Williams, E., et al. (2000).
Incidence and types of adverse events and negligent care in Utah and Colorado.
Medical Care, 38(3), 261-271.
Thomas, J., Kellogg, W, & Erickson, T. (2001). The knowledge management puzzle:
Human and social factors in knowledge management. IBM Systems Journal,
40(4), 863-884.
Thompson, C. (2003). Clinical experience as evidence in evidence-based practice.
Journal of Advanced Nursing, 43(30), 230-237.
Triola, M. (2002). Essentials of statistics. Boston: Addison-Wesley.
U.S. Department of Defense. (2008). Patient safety program. Retrieved from
http://dodpatientsafety.usuhs.mil/index.php?name=News&file=article&sid=31
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. (2003). OCR privacy brief: Summary of
the HIPAA privacy rule. Retrieved from http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy
summary.pdf
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. (2006). HIPAA administrative
simplification: Regulation text. Retrieved from http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/Admin
SimpRegText.pdf
Vaughn, D. (1996). The Challenger launch decision: Risky technology, culture, and
deviance at NASA. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Weick, K. (2002). The reduction of medical errors through mindful interdependence. In
M. Rosenthal & K. Sutcliffe (Eds.), Medical error: What do we know? What do
we do? (pp. 177-199). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Welling, H. (2005). The intuitive process: The case of psychotherapy. Journal of
Psychotherapy Integration, 15(1), 19-47. Retrieved from PsycINFO database.
Westcott, M. (1968). Toward a contemporary psychology of intuition. New York: Holt,
Rinehart, and Winston.
Wiegmann, D., & Shappell, S. (2003). A human error approach to aviation accident
analysis: The human factors analysis and classification system. Burlington, VT:
Ashgate.

141
Wilson, R., Harrison, B., Gibberd, R., & Hamilton, J. (1999). An analysis of the
causes of adverse events from the Quality in Australian Health Care Study.
Medical Journal of Australia, 170(9), 411-415.
Whiting, C. (2005). Intuitive decisions making and leadership style among health care
executives in the United States. Dissertation Abstracts International Section A:
Humanities and Social Sciences, 66(7-A). (UMI No. 3182016)
Whittingham, R. (2004). The blame machine: Why human error causes accidents.
Burlington, MA: Elsevier Butterworth-Heinemann.
Womack, J., & Jones, D. (2003). Lean thinking: Banish waste and create wealth in your
corporation. New York: Free Press.
Zhang, J., & Patel, V. (2006). Categorization of affordances [Unpublished report].
Retrieved from http://acad88.sahs.uth.tmc.edu/courses/hi6301/affordance.html

APPENDIX A: LEVELS OF BEHAVIORS INVOLVED IN ERRORS
Skill-based performance (Reason, 1990)
Inattention:
Double-capture slips
Omissions following interruptions
Reduced intentionality
Perceptual confusions
Interference errors
Rule-based performance
Misapplication of good rules:
First exceptions
Countersigns and non-signs
Informational overload
Rule strength
General Rules
Redundancy
Rigidity
Knowledge-based performance
Selectivity
Out of sight, out of mind
Overconfidence
Illusory correlation
Problems with causality
Problems with complexity
Problems with delayed feed-back
Insufficient consideration of processes in time
Difficulties with exponential developments
Thinking in causal series not causal nets
Thematic vagabonding
Encysting
Workspace limitations
Confirmation bias
Biased reviewing
Halo effects

Over attention:
Omissions
Repetitions
Reversals

Application of bad rules:
Encoding deficiencies
Action deficiencies:
Wrong rules
Inelegant rules
Inadvisable rules

APPENDIX B: ERROR CLASSIFICATION
Rasmussen (1982)
Nuclear power
Characteristics of
Human Error
Skill-based
behavior

Most basic level of human
performance, used to complete
familiar and routine tasks that
can be carried out smoothly in
an automated fashion without a
great deal of thought.

Reason (1990, 1997)
High technology
Questions whether or not a
person is engaged in problem
solving at the time an error
occurred.
Slips and lapses occur when
automatic behavior is
interrupted, or are due to a
lack of attention by an
individual, or to execution
failure.

Individual is looking for
pattern recognition.
Rule-based
behavior

Knowledge-based
behavior

More complex or less familiar
tasks carried out according to a
set of stored rules; requires
knowledge of existing rules or
norms.
Adopted when a completely
novel situation is presented for
which no stored rules exist,
oral or written, requires a plan
of action to be formulated;
changes frequently; dependent
on situational knowledge.

Rule based with memory slips
in procedural recall; requires
existing knowledge.
Knowledge based is when a
unique situation is presented;
no known rules exist;
dependent on situational
knowledge generally oral
tradition such as tacit
knowledge.

Comparison

Reason
differentiated from
Rasmussen’s work
by categorizing this
as slip or lapse: (a)
using the terms
interchangeably and
(b) attributing a
lesser degree of
severity than a
mistake.
Definitions are
comparable.

Reason viewed all
mistakes as
knowledge based.

APPENDIX C: UOR FORM
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(Used with permission, M. Graham, personal communication, July 24, 2007)

APPENDIX D: AGOR’S INTUITIVE MEASUREMENT INVENTORY
Part I: Your intuitive ability
1) When working on a project, do you prefer to:
a) Be told what the problem is, but left free to decide how to solve it?
b) Get very clear instructions about how to go about solving the problem before you
start?
2) When working on a project, do you prefer to work with colleagues who are:
a) Realistic?
b) Imaginative?
3) Do you admire people most who are:
a) Creative?
b) Careful?
4) Do the friends you choose tend to be:
a) Serious and hard working?
b) Exciting and often emotional?
5) When you ask a colleague for advice on a problem you have, do you:
a) Seldom or never get upset if he/she questions our base assumptions?
b) Often get upset if he/she questions your basic assumptions?
6) When you start your day, do you usually:
a) Seldom make or follow a specific plan to follow?
b) Make a plan first to follow?
7) When working with numbers, do you find that you:
a) Seldom or never make factual errors?
b) Often make factual errors?
8) Do you find that you:
a) Seldom daydream during the day and really don’t enjoy doing so when you do it?
b) Frequently daydream during the day and enjoy doing it?
9) When working on problem do you:
a) Prefer to follow the instructions or rules when they are given to you?
b) Often enjoy circumventing the instructions or rules when they are given to you?
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10) When you are trying to put something together, do you prefer to have:
a) Step-by-step written instructions on how to assemble the item?
b) A picture of how the item is supposed to look once assembled?
11) Do you find that the person who irritates you the most is the one who appears to be:
a) Disorganized?
b) Organized
12) When an unexpected crisis comes up that you have to deal with, do you:
a) Feel anxious about the situation?
b) Feel excited by the challenge of the situation?
Part II: Do you use your intuitive ability to make important decisions?
13) Do you believe that you use intuition frequently to guide your most important
decisions? (Check one)
Yes _____ No _____
14) If yes, in which circumstances or situations do you use your intuition to make your
most important decisions? (Circle the letter(s) of all choices that apply.)
a) Where there is a high degree of certainty
b) Where there is littler previous precedent
c) Where variables are less scientifically predictable or where “facts” are limited
d) Where there are several plausible alternative solutions to choose from with good
arguments for each
e) Where time is limited and there is pressure to be right
f) Other (specify) __________________________________
15) What kind of feelings or signals do you get when you “know” that a particular
decision is “right”? What do you rely on for cues? (Circle the letter(s) of all choices
that apply.)
a) Excitement
b) Warmth
c) Peaceful/calm
d) High energy
e) Sudden flash of insight
f) Other (specify) _____________________________________
16) Give an example (or two) of a very important decision where you followed your
intuition and it proved to be the “right” decision.
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17) What feelings or signals do you get when you “know” you are heading in the
wrong direction or should delay your decision for a while? (Circle the letter(s) of all
choices that apply.)
a) Anxious
b) Upset stomach
c) Mixed or conflicting signals
d) Other (specify) _____________________________________
18) What kinds of condition have obstructed the use of your intuition in important
decision-making situations? (Circle the letter(s) of all choices that apply.)
a) When angry
b) Under Stress
c) Too ego involved in the decision
d) Rushed my decision
e) Lack of confidence
f) Other (specify) _____________________________________
19) Did you tend to “keep it a secret” that you use intuition to make decisions, or do you
feel comfortable sharing the fact with others? (Check one).
Keep it a secret _____ Share with others _____
Please explain ________________________________________
20) When using your intuition to make a decision, where have you found it functions
best? (Circle the letter(s) of all choices that apply.)
a) At the very beginning when I am trying to assess the future or the options
available to me
b) At the very end when I am trying to sift through and digest all of the cues and
information available to me
c) It really varies depending on the problem or issue at hand (Specify)
21) When making a major decision, do you use any particular technique or method(s) to
help draw on your intuitive ability more effectively? (Check one).
Yes _____ No _____
If Yes, please describe __________________________________
22) Do you use or regularly practice any particular technique or method(s) to help
develop further your intuitive ability?
Yes _____ No _____
If Yes, please describe __________________________________
J. Harper (Used with permission, personal communication, July 25, 2007)

APPENDIX E: DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION
1. Age ___________
2. Gender: Female _________ Male ____________
3. Discipline:
Diagnostic Imaging _____
Laboratory _____
Nursing _____
Nutritional Services _____
Pastoral care _____
Pharmacy _____
Physician ______
Rehabilitative Therapies _____
Respiratory Therapy ______
Other ___________
4. Educational preparation (highest level achieved) __________
5. Number of years licensed _______
6. Number of years worked at XXX __________
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APPENDIX G: COVER LETTER AIM INVENTORY
Informed Consent Statement: The role of intuition in preventing medical errors
Dear ___________,
My name is Lynette Savage. I am nurse and doctoral student working in the XXX
Service Area to find ways to help XXX to improve patient safety. From my observations
in working with teams throughout our system, I have questioned the role of intuition in
preventing medical errors from reaching hospitalized patients. Of particular interest is in
medication related errors. I received permission from Glenn Rodriguez, MD, chief
medical officer, to begin analyzing medication-related unusual occurrence reports
(UORs) submitted from the three hospitals.
Six months of UORs related to medication errors have been analyzed for intuitive
content. Your name was selected from the UORs submitted and analyzed, and so you are
being asked to take part in a research study examining the role of intuition in preventing
medical errors. If you agree to take part in this study, you were asked to complete a
survey related to individual levels of intuition in decision making.
The survey takes about 15 minutes of your time and will not interfere with normal
work activities. An enclosed envelope is provided to return the completed survey. There
are no foreseeable risks to participants associated with this study. Completing the survey
is voluntary. If you decide not to take part in this study, it will not affect your relationship
with XXX. You will not be paid for completing and returning the survey.
Your responses will be compared to those of other health care team members to
establish aspects of intuition related to the prevention of medication errors (NMs). If you
complete the survey, your identity will be kept confidential. Your anonymity will be
maintained to the degree possible. All data were held in confidence and remain with the
investigator.
If you have questions or concerns, you may contact me, Lynette Savage, at
(XXX) XXX-XXXX, or the dissertation chair, Dr. David Metcalf via email at
david.metcalf@waldenu.edu. You may also contact the XXX Institutional Review Board
at (XXX) XXX-XXXX if you have questions or comments regarding your rights as a
research participant. You may request a copy of the results of this research. The findings
were used to try to help prevent medical errors.
Sincerely,
Lynette Savage, RN, MS, CPHQ
Project Manager, Black Belt

APPENDIX H: REMINDER E-MAIL FOR SURVEY PARTICIPANTS
TO:
FROM: Lynette Savage
Date:
Regarding: Completing Survey - Intuition and Preventing Errors
Earlier this week, you received a cover letter, survey, and return envelope asking
you to participate in a research study on intuition and preventing errors from reaching
hospitalized patients. I am nurse working in the XXX Service Area to find ways we as an
organization can improve patient safety based on my observations in working with teams
throughout our system.
You are being asked to complete a survey related to individual levels of intuition
in decision making as part of a study examining the role of intuition in preventing
medical errors. Six months of UORs related to medication errors have been analyzed for
intuitive content. Your name was selected from the UORs submitted and analyzed to
complete the survey. I have attached a copy of the survey. Please print and complete this
survey. You can inter-office mail your completed survey to Lynette Savage, XXXXX,
MOB Suite 835. The survey will require 15 minutes of your time. You are not required to
complete this survey.
Thank you so much for your willingness to participate. Finding ways to keep
patients safe is a top priority. The XXX Institutional Review Board has approved this
study.

APPENDIX I: INFORMED CONSENT
Informed Consent Statement: The role intuition plays in preventing medical errors
Informed Consent for a Research Study
Study Title: Intuitive Decisions as a Means of Preventing Medical Errors
Principal Investigator: Lynette Savage, MS, BSN, BS, CPHQ
Introduction and Purpose
You are being asked to take part in a research study. The purpose of this study is
to explore the role of intuition in preventing medical errors from reaching hospitalized
patients. If you decide to take part in this research study, you will be interviewed by
Lynette Savage, R.N., a doctoral candidate at Walden University. The interviews will be
unstructured, which means that there is no script of questions. If you agree to it, the
interviews will be audio- videotaped, and will take about 30 minutes of your time. The
interviews will not interfere with normal work activities. Also, you may choose whether
the audio or videotaped segments can be used for research, presentation, publication, or
research purposes only.
Your responses will be qualitatively compared to those of other health care team
members to establish aspects of intuition related to NMs. Your precise responses will be
edited so that your position and affiliation with the institution will not be recognizable, if
you so choose. Your anonymity will be maintained to the degree possible. All data were
held in confidence and remain with the investigator.
If you are interviewed, you will be asked questions regarding experiences in
stopping or preventing a medical error from reaching a hospitalized patient. Please keep
in mind our duty to protect patient privacy, since there may be a temptation to talk about
the patient by name or some other individual identifier. This is a reminder of identifiers
that cannot be associated with the information you are about to provide:
1. Patient name;
2. Street address, city, county, precinct, state, zip code, or the equivalent geocodes;
3. All elements of dates directly related to an individual, including birth date,
admission date, discharge date, date of death;
4. Telephone or fax numbers;
5. Electronic mail addresses;
6. Social Security numbers;
7. Medical record number;
8. Health plan beneficiary numbers;
9. Account numbers;
10. Certificate/license numbers;
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11. Vehicle identifiers, serial numbers, or license plate number; or
12. Device identifiers.
If you do identify any patient by one of the items listed above, the researcher will remove
the identifier at the time of transcription before the data are analyzed. The researcher will
be the only person transcribing the tapes.
Risks
There are no foreseeable risks to participants associated with this study.
Benefits
You may or may not benefit from taking part in this research. The findings from
these interviews will contribute to a fuller understanding of traits or activities of health
care team members in preventing medical errors and will be used to help others involved
in patient safety-related activities.
General Information
Your participation is voluntary. If you choose not to take part in this study, it will
not affect your relationship with XXX. If you choose to take part, you may withdraw
from this study at any point without reprisal. You will not be paid for taking part in this
study.
If you have questions or concerns, you may contact the researcher, Lynette
Savage at (XXX) XXX-XXXX, or the dissertation chair, Dr. David Metcalf, via email at
david.metcalf@waldenu.edu. If you have questions or comments regarding your rights as
a research participant, you may contact the Institutional Review Board at Walden
University at irb@waldenu.edu or the XXX Institutional Review Board at (XXX) XXXXXXX. You may keep a copy of the informed consent. You may request a copy of the
results of this research.
AUTHORIZATION:
Based on the information provided by the researcher,
________ I agree that segments of the recordings made of my interview as part of this
research may be used for conference presentations.
________I do not want segments of the recordings made of my interview to be used for
conference presentations.
Participant’s Initials/Date: ______________
________ I agree that segments of the recordings made of my interview in this research
may be used for education and training of future researchers/health care team members.
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________I do not want segments of the recordings made of my interview in this
research to be used for education and training of future researchers/health care team
members.
Participant’s Initials/Date: ______________
________ I agree that segments of the recordings made of my interview in this research
may be used for publication.
________I do not want segments of the recordings made of my interview in this research
to be used for publication.
Participant’s Initials/Date: ______________
Once segments have been chosen, the remainder of the recordings must be
destroyed (unless approved for archiving). Segments cannot be used for any purposes
beyond those detailed and consented to in this informed consent form.
I am willing to be interviewed by Lynette Savage as part of her doctoral
dissertation. By signing this form, I grant permission for information I provide in the
interview and transcript to be used as described above.
_____________________________________________
Signature

______________
Date

_____________________________________________
Signature of Person Obtaining Consent

______________
Date

APPENDIX J: HIPPA REGULATIONS REGARDING PATIENT IDENTIFIERS
During this interview, you will be asked questions regarding experiences in
stopping or preventing a medical error from reaching a hospitalized patient. There may be
a tendency to talk about the patient by name or some other individual identifier. This is a
reminder of identifiers that cannot be associated with the information you are about to
provide:
1. Patient name;
2. Street address, city, county, precinct, state, zip code, or the equivalent geocodes;
3. All elements of dates directly related to an individual, including birth date,
admission date, discharge date, date of death;
4. Telephone or fax numbers;
5. Electronic mail addresses;
6. Social Security numbers;
7. Medical record number;
8. Health plan beneficiary numbers;
9. Account numbers;
10. Certificate/license numbers;
11. Vehicle identifiers, serial numbers, or license plate number; or
12. Device identifiers.
If you do identify the patient by one of the items listed above, the researcher will remove
the identifier at the time of transcription before the data are analyzed. The researcher will
be the only person transcribing the tapes.
_____________________________________________
Signature

______________
Date

_____________________________________________
Witness Signature

______________
Date
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